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146.

No. 1

INDIA AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS

PRICE

852

SOME NOTES ON THE SPEAKERS

WICKHAM STEED, the Chairman of these discussions, was born in 1871. After acting as correspondent of *The Times* in Berlin, Rome and Vienna, he became its editor in 1919. The author of many books, he has, in recent years, been one of the B.B.C.'s most popular speakers on World Affairs.

SIR MALCOLM DARLING served in the I.C.S. from 1904 to 1943. Amongst other activities he was Chairman of the Punjab Banking Enquiry Committee and Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University. He is the author of three books on rural life in the Punjab.

SIR RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR, now Supply Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, was, at the time of these discussions, India's representative on the Imperial War Cabinet.

CAPTAIN QUINTIN HOGG, at 36, is one of the youngest Members of Parliament. He has represented the constituency of Oxford City for the National Conservative Party since 1938, and served in the forces from 1939 to 1941.

LORD HAILEY, successively Governor of the Punjab and of the United Provinces, was raised to the peerage in 1936. Since his retirement from India he has been engaged in work for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. His monumental *African Survey* appeared in 1938, and *The Future of Colonial Peoples* in 1943.

H. N. BRAILSFORD, volunteer in the Greek Foreign Legion in 1897, joined the Independent Labour Party in 1907 and has written much on international affairs.

SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, born in India in 1879, is Master of University College, Oxford. He is best known as the author of the famous *Beveridge Report*, published in 1942, which contains proposals for a system of compulsory and universal social insurance for the British isles.

SIR ATUL CHATTERJEE passed first in the I.C.S. open competition in 1896. After twenty years' varied service in the United Provinces, he represented the Government of India in different capacities at Washington (1919), Geneva (1921), London (1925–31) and Ottawa (1932).

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WICKHAM STEED · SIR MALCOLM DARLING
QUINTIN HOGG · SIR RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR
LORD HAILEY · H. N. BRAILSFORD
SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE · SIR ATUL CHATTERJEE
DESMOND MACCARTHY · KINGSLEY MARTIN
SIR SAMUEL RUNGANADHAN · LORD LYTTON

INDIAN BRANCH

HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE, LONDON, E.C. 4
Edinburgh Glasgow New York
Toronto Melbourne Capetown
Bombay Calcutta Madras
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE
UNIVERSITY

First published, May 1944

852

PRINTED IN INDIA BY F. McD. TOMKINSON AT THE
WESLEY PRESS AND PUBLISHING HOUSE, MYSORE CITY
AND PUBLISHED BY HUMPHREY MILFORD, BOMBAY

I. INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION

Speakers

MR WICKHAM STEED
SIR MALCOLM DARLING
SIR RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR
CAPTAIN QUINTIN HOGG
LORD HAILEY

STEED. Your qualification to open these talks on 'India and the Four Freedoms' is obvious. My qualification, if any, is that I have been interested all my life in what is vaguely called 'freedom'.

DARLING. My only qualification is that for many years I have been up against the problem of freedom in India, and that ever since I went there. . .

STEED. How long ago was that?

DARLING. Thirty-nine years. Ever since then I have hoped that one day we should be able to hand over the reins of government to India herself.

STEED. We all hope that now.

DARLING. Yes, that's a big change that has come over England—how big I did not realize until I came back here three years ago.

STEED. War always quickens the pace.

DARLING. Well, perhaps we can put it down to the war that the goal is now so near that we can assume in these discussions that it has been reached; that, indeed, in dealing with the problems of the post-war world India will be just as free as Great Britain.

STEED. Britain and India have not the same background or the same kind of history. Aren't you overlooking the fact that the growth of political freedom in England was a very long process, and that centuries passed before we could define political freedom to ourselves at all accurately?

DARLING. In politics, of course, as in everything else, experience is of the greatest importance, and India's experience has been very different from Britain's. We might well have done more than we have to give her the type of experience she needs for the future.

STEED. How do you mean? Surely since the last war we have given her a great opportunity.

DARLING. That's a matter of opinion. What I meant was that we should have started much earlier than we did. The English are terribly late starters in everything. But what I should like to discuss with you, very briefly, is a more fundamental question—the kind of freedom the world will want after the war. This is a question which touches us all, wherever we live and whatever our experience.

STEED. President Roosevelt has put one answer in the shape of his Four Freedoms.

DARLING. A good answer, no doubt, and it is perhaps a point in its favour that, though it comes from America, it should be possible to apply it to countries as different as Britain and India.

STEED. Yes, exactly . . . but I don't think we ought to forget the fact that American ideas of freedom came in the first instance from England. Weren't they derived directly and indirectly from the English Revolution of 1688, and then from the French Encyclopaedists who, like Voltaire, got a good deal of their inspiration from England? Political freedom in this sense seems to me essentially English and European, that is to say Western.

Now do you think that this essentially Western notion of freedom, of the dignity of the human personality and so on, holds good, or can hold good, for the East—and especially for India?

DARLING. I should doubt myself whether any purely Western notion will suit India without a good deal of modification. I have seen too many Western notions going wrong there; for example, our legal system. I sympathize strongly with what Pandit Motilal Nehru said nearly twenty years

ago: 'What I want', he said, 'is a system which is native to India and of which we have no experience in Europe and America.' We should remember, too, that India was the cradle of spiritual freedom, and surely in the post-war world spiritual freedom will be as important as any other kind of freedom?

STEED. I should say again, within limits.

DARLING. Personally, I should say without any limit at all; and certainly, if the post-war world is to be settled mainly on a materialistic basis, that won't suit India, or indeed many of us over here.

STEED. But can one safely mix up religion and politics?

DARLING. Perhaps not religion and politics, but surely ethics and politics. In India religion and ethics are virtually identical, and they have always been mixed up with politics. No one there has so great a hold upon the popular imagination as the saint.

STEED. I suppose Mahatma Gandhi is an example of this?

DARLING. This is the secret of his influence in the village, as has been the case with many others in the past. To the Indian peasant—and he numbers nearly 300 out of India's 400 millions—spiritual freedom has always been the thing that ultimately mattered; as remote from his daily life, no doubt, as the great Himalayan peaks but dominating the background of his mind. Of other kinds of freedom he has thought little—of political freedom not at all. But now he is beginning to think of economic freedom, and there he has more claim upon the future than any other section of the community.

STEED. I can see that might apply to peasants elsewhere as well.

DARLING. Yes, indeed. In different degrees it applies to peasants everywhere. So much so that I should like to see their claims put into a Peasants' Charter. But that's not an idea likely to be taken up in this country, as in England the peasant is virtually a museum piece.

STEED. Well, I remember Lord Cromer used to say that

the essential thing to remember is that what the peasants want is low taxation and firm impartial justice.

DARLING. Those two things at least we may claim to have given the Indian peasant in the past.

STEED. And a great Polish leader whom I used to know in Austria said there are two things the peasants want—more land and fewer taxes.

DARLING. There's no doubt he wants more land, nowhere more so than in India. There the peasant would rather lose his life than his land. Never is he more eloquent than when he asks for land. 'Why does Government not give me land?' once pleaded a peasant to me. 'Our work is farming. What else can we do? Where else can we go? We *must* have land. I have committed no fault. I have not stolen. I have done no crime. I have a wife and two children, and only three acres.' A typical cry, and a typical case. There are millions of peasants who have less than five acres. The hunger for more is extreme.

STEED. But is there more land available?

DARLING. There is, but not nearly enough to meet the needs of a population which is growing very fast—50 millions in ten years. The real remedy is increased production all round.

STEED. You feel, then, that the economic aspects of freedom must take precedence over its political aspects, though not necessarily over its spiritual aspects?

DARLING. Ultimately it's the spiritual aspects of freedom that matter most for us all, but they are becoming more and more an individual problem, and less and less a State problem. On the other hand, economic freedom is becoming more and more a State problem. Political freedom is necessarily that, and doubtless matters most to the intelligentsia in any country where political conditions are unstable or in a state of transition. But in India poverty is so great that for the ordinary man, whether in the fields or the bazaar, to fill the belly is the paramount consideration. Everyone who goes to India from England for the first

time is horrified at the contrast. 'It burns like acid into the brain' is what one observer said recently. The only thing that mitigates it is that poverty in a warm country is very different from poverty in a cold, sunless country like England.

STEED. That is a point Emile Zola made in his book on Rome. Comparing poverty in Paris with poverty in Italy, he said it was more bearable in Italy because of the warm Italian sun.

DARLING. Ah yes, that's most true. One must remember, too, that there are parts of India where the peasants are comparatively well off, better off, in fact, than in some parts of Europe. But in the mass, as Jawaharlal Nehru once wrote, the peasants produce 'a feeling of overwhelming pity and a sense of ever-impending tragedy'. In India—and not only in India—poverty is the fundamental problem and I don't think that most of its 400 millions will get much enjoyment out of political freedom unless it gives them some measure at least of economic freedom.

STEED. Up to a point I agree with you. Perhaps we may be able to discover in one or other of these discussions the point at which economic freedom—that is freedom from want—becomes merged with the other three—that is, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, and freedom of worship.

DARLING. I agree that they are all closely connected, and as such they should be kept in balance with each other. In India the balance has been upset. The two freedoms of expression and worship have fared pretty well, but the other two have clashed.

STEED. How do you mean?

DARLING. What I mean is that the comparative freedom from fear, due to the *Pax Britannica*, has led to an enormous increase in the population, and now, though there is much more to go round than a hundred years ago, there are far more mouths to feed. The general standard of living has, I believe, risen in spite of this—Mahatma Gandhi

would not agree to that—but poverty is still acute and it may well undermine the whole future set-up of political freedom, unless it is systematically tackled.

That brings me to another point: we say we are fighting for democracy. Democracy, no doubt, has many different forms. But will any form be possible when the great mass of people are as poor and as illiterate as they are in India?

STEED. When you invoke the sacred name of democracy you fill me with awe. For I don't really know what democracy means. It certainly doesn't mean either dictatorship or mob rule. It means, I fancy, some form of representative government in which the people, not directly but through their representatives, have the last word.

DARLING. Dr Lindsay in his recent book on democracy says that its two watchwords are equality and liberty, and he adds that there must be 'reverence for the common humanity of everyday people'. It's this last point I should like to emphasize. There has not been nearly enough reverence in the past for the common humanity of everyday people. Look at the way the peasant, and the factory hand too, have been exploited. Now at last the pendulum is swinging the other way. The talk is all of what is due to the common man, and doubtless after the war politician, propagandist and philanthropist will vie with each other in hatching out schemes for his benefit. Even the agitator may take a hand in the game. Here I think we should walk a little warily. Do you remember what Catherine the Great said to the French philosopher, Diderot? 'You only work on paper, which endures all things: it opposes no obstacles either to your imagination or your pen. But I, poor Empress as I am, work on the human skin, which is irritable and ticklish to a very different degree.' After the war the human skin is likely to be exceptionally irritable and ticklish.

STEED. Now, in a moment this discussion is going to be enlarged with the help of a very distinguished Indian, Sir

Ramaswami Mudaliar, of Captain Quintin Hogg, and Lord Hailey. If I understand something that Sir Ramaswami once said, the task before us is that of securing the rights of all sections of opinion in India. And he pointed out that this isn't a task which can be performed once and for all, but that it is a continuing problem, in other parts of the world besides India; in fact freedom, including democratic freedom, is a growing concern, not a museum exhibit.

DARLING. There I agree with you entirely. But it's not only in India that the rights of all sections will have to be safeguarded. It's the *sine qua non* of freedom everywhere, and it follows that obligations should be realized at least as keenly as rights. In India, fortunately, the sense of obligation has always been strong, though within a much narrower compass than the future requires. But with us all, it requires to be widened.

STEED. Then you come very near the standpoint of the ablest exponent of democracy I have ever known, the late President Masaryk, who never tired of reminding his people that self-government is self-control.

DARLING. Yes, indeed—that goes to the root of the matter. . . . For peoples, as for individuals, self-control is a continuing problem—and a fundamental condition of freedom.

STEED. Yes; it's a continuing problem, as you very rightly said. Dr G. P. Gooch once wrote this: 'A democracy at its best is not only government by discussion but government by consent. Political liberty could be defined as the right of a minority to transform itself by argument into a majority if it can. . . .' The object is not merely that the majority shall lay down the law but that it shall be so wise ultimately as to command the assent of the minority even if it has to override the minority by a vote.

Now, how far is this condition of majority rule understood in India?

RAMASWAMI. Well, there are special problems connected with these questions so far as India is concerned. It may be that special safeguards will have to be devised by those

who sit round a round table to devise a constitution; but the proposition has been that the majority must get the consent of the minority. The ideal is that the majority should ultimately gain the consent of the minority.

STEED. And gain the *confidence* of the minority.

RAMASWAMI. That makes it even more difficult. The assumption that a Government can obtain the confidence of a minority is not an easy assumption.

HOGG. All the same, in order to get a democracy which is formed on freedom, which is what you were talking about, you must have a 'demos'—that is to say, a single homogeneous people. Now there are some parts of the world where there doesn't seem to be such a 'demos' or 'people'. I think England has developed into a democracy largely because the English people have remained at bottom a single homogeneous people.

RAMASWAMI. You are including the Scotch and the Welsh when using the term 'English'?

HOGG. Well, the original inspiration of the constitution was English, not Welsh or Scotch, but I think it's fair to say that they have regarded themselves for many centuries, not as Englishmen, but as part of one single political community.

RAMASWAMI. But one should not assume that there are two 'demoses' in India. In the first place I don't want to anticipate what the nature of the constitution is for India; I don't want even to anticipate now whether India will be divided into two territorial parts or not.

HAILEY. Or more, Ramaswami?

RAMASWAMI. Or more, yes. But that will lead us far away from our discussion. But taking it for granted that the territorial unity you're thinking of is composed of more than one community—don't you think that in many of the functions of the State, divisions will not lie along racial differences but more on geographical and economic bases?

HOGG. Well, all I can say is this: if that is so, and I sincerely hope it may be so, then you have solved your problem and everything will be quite all right.

RAMASWAMI. Not entirely. There will still be cases where religious difference will be at the bottom of an issue which comes before Parliament. It is possible that no question of majority or no decision of overriding the minority may arise in such cases. That is to say, we could provide against a majority overriding the wishes of a minority by the safeguard that two-thirds of the minority concerned in a particular issue must have given consent to that proposition. So the rule of thumb democratic majority decision may be toned down, still with the principle of democratic decision being kept in view because the majority concerned binds the minority to accept it or not.

STEED. That's a well-known device; it's in the South African constitution.

HOGG. But you'll agree that, in the end, for it to work, there must be unity of spirit—the Indians in one community and the Indians in another community must still regard themselves as Indians; they're both members of the one homogeneous people.

RAMASWAMI. I claim that now we really think of ourselves as Indians. If we are *not* thinking of ourselves as Indians there's no need to think of full freedom at all.

HAILEY. Is that conception only limited to the circumstances in which the Indian has to face the outside world, or does it extend to purely Indian relations—the relation of Indian to Indian? I am not speaking as one who has no belief that India can make her own constitution: I have always held the view that there are forces at work which will enable her to effect these adjustments over a period of time. But to my mind—perhaps it's the result of being so long in the administration—India should concentrate on no purely abstract question, but on the concrete problems that she will have to face as soon as she has got her own constitution and is making her own laws. I can see that question arising in quite a large number of different aspects. Take what might seem not so directly a contentious aspect as is the religious field; take the cultural

aspect. You remember the trouble that we have had about the use of languages in education. Take the economic aspect—the trouble that has arisen over the relations between owners of land. There are a very large number of problems of this kind—and I'm sure, Ramaswami, you know them even better than I. These are problems which will demand a considerably greater degree of common feeling, of willingness to concede to the opinions of others, than exists at present.

RAMASWAMI. Well, I find it a little difficult to be drawn into this discussion because we started with the assumption that India had attained full freedom.

HAILEY. Full political freedom.

RAMASWAMI. Yes.

HAILEY. But that isn't the end of the story.

RAMASWAMI. I quite agree—that isn't the end of the story, but we should not drift back into the position that political freedom is not attainable.

HAILEY. No; I was only trying to be helpful—trying to envisage the problems which young India will have to face and how best to surmount them. I'm not maintaining that the differences are so great or the obstacles so numerous that you can never find any solution to them. That is *not* my view. I was merely trying to come down to certain practical problems which illustrate the kind of difficulties India will have to meet as soon as she has obtained her political freedom.

RAMASWAMI. Yes, it is perfectly true that the desire to get rid of a foreign agency binds the people in India more readily than the impulse to be a united people among themselves. But let me add this: democracy implies that there cannot be united peoples so far as internal problems are concerned. I think somebody has said that it is essential for the successful working of democratic institutions that there should be parties—two parties preferably. Democratic principles imply the clashing of minds in any important issue.

STEED. Your contention, as I understand it, is that, given full freedom for all parties, the division between the parties would not be based on religious lines. You would get, for instance, Muslims and Hindus working together on one issue and on another issue opposing each other; is that your concept?

RAMASWAMI. Yes, in the vast majority of cases it would be so. But there are a few cases where the religious element will dominate the issue, and those cases can be provided for by the expedient that I suggested before.

It is true that we have constantly to work up to this idea that we are all citizens of one country and that the greatest good of the greatest number is our objective. But that's a problem that every country has to face. It's one which Canada and South Africa are facing today, it's a problem which the United States also has to face to some extent. It may be that in the beginning we shall have to face this problem much more seriously than others. But that is the birth-pang of a fully free nation.

HAILEY. I think that's true. These problems do exist everywhere—they are part of the history of all peoples. Sometimes the solution has been found, as was the case in the United States in the 'sixties, by open conflict. There are other cases where that problem, and it's a very deep-seated problem, is settled by the triumph of a strong spirit of nationalism and common citizenship. There are cases where I think that problems which at first appear to be fundamental, and almost insoluble, because they are based on strong religious differences, find their solution in other directions—owing to the emergence of other strong interests—interests based on industrial development, or the development of the land, and agricultural policies.

I think there are still other instances where the solution has been found in a wide diffusion of cultural or similar interests, as in Great Britain itself where we have a common meeting-ground in a thousand different ways.

I was just wondering which of these solutions would be

likely to be adopted in India herself. I was hoping you might be able to help us by envisaging the process by which you would arrive at that adjustment, because you'll agree that at the moment a spirit of adjustment is not very strongly marked. In fact it's much less strongly marked now than it used to be. I have myself seen these cultural or communal differences develop from very small beginnings; they occurred, for instance, at the time when the religious festivals coincided, and so forth. The arrival of democratic institutions which gave so much value to the vote of the numerical majority seems to have accentuated this clash and widened that gulf. I was wondering whether the further progress of democracy would bring its own remedy in a reasonable time.

RAMASWAMI. You've indicated a fact I can't deny, but I'm afraid the reason for it has not been properly understood. It's perfectly true that at the present time the clash on the communal base is more prominent than at any time within living recollection. It is true that the two great communities, Hindus and Muslims, seem to be more widely separated in ideals now than at any time previously, but I beg to differ from you in this: that it's *not* an indication of what's likely to happen under any form of democratic rule when political freedom is assured to us. This difference—accentuated as it now is—is, I think, the precursor of that constitutional adjustment which is bound to follow. Up to now, the communities were not certain that India would attain freedom soon. Now, the concept is that at the end of this war India will definitely have full freedom. And the nearer you get to the stage of full freedom the louder are bound to be the claims which different communities make for themselves. Therefore the clash between the two communities is bound to be much more divergent and much more wide than it was before. This is not to be taken as an indication of how wide or how difficult or how sharp the clash will be in the future. If I were to take that view I would despair of India obtaining full freedom

at all. But I don't. I take the view that it's a healthy sign when people who are considering their new constitution try to get whatever safeguards there may be for themselves; and, in trying, put forward the biggest claims possible. Just consider what would happen if today in Great Britain or the United States the entire constitution were put back into the melting-pot and people tried to devise a new constitution. I'm certain that the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party and the Labour Party in this country would be much more widely divided on various issues than ever before.

STEED. You have made out an interesting case, Ramaswami.

HOGG. I also agree up to a point. But I think there's this important difference, and that's why I'm not quite so sure that these are healthy signs. Compare, for instance, the divergence which actually exists in Ireland. Imagine these religious differences being the real basis of political division, and not the economic and political expressions of opinion. I can't agree, I'm afraid, that communal clashes as such between religious communities can ever be healthy signs.

RAMASWAMI. I wasn't thinking of communal clashes being healthy in that way. I said it was a healthy sign that Indians realized they were so near to the ultimate solution of the problem.

STEED. I think I ought now to sum up this talk on political freedom. We have had the views of Ramaswami, of Hailey and of Quintin Hogg. Even if they do not all agree, they have touched upon aspects of this important and intricate problem which deserve fuller consideration than any of us may have given to them before this talk began. Next time we shall discuss freedom from fear, internal and external; and this is a matter which is not Indian only. It is as world-wide as freedom itself, because we shall be dealing with freedom in time and space, not with freedom as an abstract philosophical or religious proposition. And when, later on, we get to the economic freedom which Malcolm Darling dwelt upon we shall find it a very concrete problem indeed.

II. FREEDOM FROM FEAR

Speakers

MR WICKHAM STEED
CAPTAIN QUINTIN HOGG
LORD HAILEY
SIR RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR

STEED. Last time, when I summed up, I said I thought we should find freedom from fear quite as world-wide in its implications as political freedom.

Now, Quintin Hogg is the youngest man here, and so, as he has the greatest likelihood of having a long personal interest in this organization of freedom from fear, I should like to ask him how he conceives it.

HOGG. I think people are apt to talk about this too much in abstract terms. You have already got a structure built and growing up for you; the United Nations' armies are actually composed of various nationalities. In the same war you've got a number of Governments interlocked together by such an elaborate structure that nothing short of a surgical operation can really divorce them. That structure was brought into being for the purpose of war. The question for the nations to decide will be this: shall it continue in being for the purpose of peace? If it is continued in being for the purpose of peace, then I can foresee a good chance of peace for the world.

STEED. You prompt me to ask what you mean by 'peace'. Do you mean merely non-war, an absence of armed strife, or do you mean what are the essentials of peace in a civilized community applied to an international community—that is, order based on law and mutual helpfulness? Constructive international helpfulness ought, I submit, to be a function of the present organization if it continues in being and has peace as its purpose.

HOGG. Well, all human terms are relative, you know. I should have thought I meant both of the things you said. I regard peace in the sense of absence from war as something which a good many of us would be very content with for another hundred years.

HAILEY. May I suggest that we discuss this problem in terms of security? And security has a double meaning—first, the provision of means for preventing aggression; and secondly, some form of co-operation that will attack the conditions which invite aggression—such as economic inequalities between nations and social disabilities within them. So if the organization that we possess at present and which, of course, itself has that double aspect—as evidenced by our post-war relief measures and the like—if that continues in being, then it seems to me that you have a working basis for building up security.

RAMASWAMI. I'm not quite so sure. I agree that the present organization must form a basis on which we can build at the end of the war to secure the two objectives which Hailey has mentioned. But to say that we already possess such an organization is, I think, taking too optimistic a view. Clearly, the present organization is kept in being by those stresses and strains of the war itself and by the fact that we have an enemy opposed to us who must be defeated. When that motive power lapses at the end of the war, when victory has been obtained, I doubt if the present organization will continue, either in its present form or in any altered form, unless the nations which are now united have a design which I shall call a 'global structure'.

HOGG. Well, that's perhaps a little too definite.

RAMASWAMI. Unless the United Nations have some sort of design of that kind and plan for that . . .

STEED. I understood you to mean, Hogg, that the recoil from war would guarantee us peace for a long time.

HOGG. What I meant by my remarks was that there will be a structure in existence which the present participants will be able to terminate as they terminated the alliance at

the end of the last war. In which case I don't see much hope. But it will be equally possible for them to say that they intend to continue it for peace, although it was created for war. In which case I think there's good hope.

STEED. So you are conceiving some kind of permanent community of nations?

HOGG. Yes, that's what I want to see.

STEED. Well now, on this question of the community of nations, a very interesting statement was made in 1918 by that outstanding American lawyer, Elihu Root. He said that the whole question turns on the possibility of making every sovereign State subject to the superior right of a 'community of sovereign States' to have the peace preserved. He went on to argue that if you could get a community of sovereign States agreeing to this principle, you would have for the first time a real international community, and the consequences which would flow from it would be almost revolutionary.

HAILEY. But your community of nations might mean two things. It might mean a general consensus for action in particular directions only: or it might mean the creation of some sort of super-State organization to which each component member would resign a certain part of its independence or its sovereignty. For instance, it might agree to place in the hands of the super-State the means of defence and sufficient economic control to secure the means to provide defence. Now, those are two different things.

HOGG. Yes, but look. There are two developments since Elihu Root. The first is the general recognition that there is an intermediate stage between the pure nationalities of the nineteenth century and the sort of super-State he was speaking of, which is a stage of regionalization. This was very clearly brought out by Mr Churchill's broadcast when he spoke of a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia.

The second aspect is this: I don't visualize a country resigning its sovereignty to any new structure which comes into being for the express purpose of taking over that

sovereignty, but I visualize that sovereignty will already have passed to some extent in the course of the political changes which will have come by the end of the war. The question will be this: will they want to resume that sovereignty by a conscious act or permit the structure through which the sovereignty has been limited during the war to continue and develop?

STEED. I should like to ask Ramaswami how he thinks India would feel in the presence of such an implied sacrifice of individual sovereignty, in exchange for membership of some international community, be it the British Commonwealth of Nations, or as a member of what he has just called a global structure.

RAMASWAMI. Well, I should prefer to speak, not of a sacrifice in that connexion, but of a contribution which India will make, in company and on equal terms with the other members of the structure.

Indian opinion has begun to realize that the old ideas of sovereignty must be given up and have been given up by most States, and from that point of view India will be quite as willing as any other sovereign State to reconcile herself to a position that, while she is independent, she is also interdependent and has to work in co-operation with other States. This implies that some of her decisions may be subject to the decisions of this bigger body. In other words, the new idea of sovereignty implies interdependence as well as the retention of sovereignty.

STEED. Now, India through her representatives accepted the League Covenant and the abolition of neutrality was implied in Article Sixteen. Now, I assume that a free India would wish to be just as co-operative as the former India was.

RAMASWAMI. Much of the criticism about the League of Nations was on the basis that in the past it was in the hands of a few nations who looked after their own interests or of nations largely European. But if the new organization is going to be absolutely equitable in its dealing and based

on certain fundamental concepts, India would be quite willing to come in wholeheartedly with any such global organization.

I cannot imagine India refusing to join such an organization, or refusing to play her part in contributing to the establishment, or maintenance, of peace in any such organization. India has been always willing to take her proper and dignified place in any comity of nations. Indian troops have, of course, played their part in resisting aggression in Europe.

STEED. For instance?

RAMASWAMI. For instance, long before the last Great War, in 1878 I think it was, towards the end of the Russo-Turkish war, when Russia was determined to have a tilt at Turkey and Great Britain was anxious not to be involved. It was Beaconsfield who, as Prime Minister, ordered a brigade to be sent from India to Malta, and according to Beaconsfield's letters and memoirs it was the presence of that brigade at Malta which made Russia more reasonable and withdraw from the recalcitrant position which she had taken up. The contribution of India in the last war is well known; and today we're doing what we can, not merely because India is directly threatened but long before India was threatened directly either from the west or east, to join the other forces of other countries which were trying to help secure international peace and freedom from aggression.

STEED. Didn't India take a passionate interest in the fate of Abyssinia in 1936?

RAMASWAMI. Certainly she did. When Japan occupied Manchuria, when Italy attacked Abyssinia, and on later occasions when other countries were attacked or threatened by Germany, India was wholeheartedly in favour of action being taken against the aggressors.

It has been the case all through, not because India was directly threatened but because she felt these aggressions should be stopped and, if they were not stopped, they would

grow like a snowball until everybody was involved in common disaster.

HOGG. What you've been saying raises another question—you've been talking about the willingness of India to join in the full society of nations. But what you say raises the question whether she would be willing to join us even more closely than that. You see, if we have to stand by ourselves, we in Great Britain after this war may be precious small beer. But if we are regarded as part of the British Commonwealth—a body of nations knit together rather more closely than a general comity of nations, partly for sentimental, partly for political and partly for economic reasons—we shall be able to play a decisive part in world affairs. Now, would India be willing to join us in a close co-operation like the other parts of the British Commonwealth and also to take her part in any larger organization?

RAMASWAMI. There are two views on that. The first is that India should play her part in any international organization that may be built up for the security of peace and that she should depend upon that organization for her own security when forces too powerful to deal with alone are arrayed against her; and that she should contribute equally with others to the extent of her capacity when any other member of the global organization is threatened.

The other view is that provided India is given full freedom—the same status and the same basic rights as any of the self-governing Dominions like Australia or Canada—India will be willing to continue to be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and also to take her part in any larger international association.

HAILEY. So, India, according to this view, would, once she is free, be prepared to join the British Commonwealth?

RAMASWAMI. Well, if you take it that full freedom and full status are assured, there's no reason why India should not continue to be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. And it's not merely a question of sentiment.

As I see it, the British Commonwealth of Nations is held together not because the people in these 'wide flung Dominions', as they are called, are of one race or one tongue, one religion or one creed—there are a variety of these; but it's because there are some fundamental principles of justice, of common fair play, that bind these Dominions together. And India is very much attached to these fundamental principles.

There's another reason why India would like to continue in the British Commonwealth of Nations. After all, in the stresses and strains of these great global wars during the last twenty-five years, the British Commonwealth of Nations has stood solid; in fact, in this war, when everything was going against them after the battle of Dunkirk, the only thing that stood between the aggressors and a free world after the war was the British Commonwealth of Nations. The people of the countries comprising this Commonwealth never had any doubt that they should stand together and that they would still be in a position to defeat the enemy. According to this view it is not unreasonable to desire the continuance of the security of an existing and tried organization in addition to the security of a new international body.

HAILEY. What do you think India's demands would be on attaining her full political freedom? Won't her first attitude be to insist on everything which will emphasize her independence? It is not an unnatural attitude in the circumstances but may lead to her making heavy demands on others.

RAMASWAMI. I don't conceive of India making any demands in her self-interest when once she attains full freedom or independence. Her attitude at any Conference Table will rather be the assertion of her own dignity and self-respect, and the claiming of fair play and justice and fair treatment for herself, or for any other member-State in the Conference, in international dealings.

The desire of India to join in any global organization

for the maintenance of international security will arise from a feeling that such an organization will be based on certain fundamental principles of humanity, of justice and of equitable dealing between nation and nation, acceptable and accepted by all members of the organization. The purely material idea of securing even peace by any other means would not appeal to her; much less would the idea of maintaining the *status quo* of nations have any attraction for her.

STEED. When you say 'global' do you mean 'universal'?

RAMASWAMI. Not necessarily universal; I do not think it would be possible to have a universal organization, but I was thinking in terms of a larger organization than the British Commonwealth of Nations. If all those nations of like mind could gather together and form an association for the preservation of peace in the world, India would like to sit at the Conference Table with all like-minded nations for that purpose.

STEED. Do you think that one of the underlying motives of this readiness would be the wish to contribute to what is now called Freedom from Fear in the world?

RAMASWAMI. Undoubtedly! Undoubtedly it would be so!

STEED. And if I interpret rightly what you say it wouldn't be solely the desire to provide for India's own security, which would make her join such an organization?

RAMASWAMI. Certainly not. India would not join such an organization as a helpless nation who wants to be protected by others against a possible aggressor. India is able to take care of herself. When we have our full freedom after the war, the expansion that has taken place in our various fighting services, the industrial progress which is now taking place owing to the war and the greater organizations which we are looking forward to—all these will be a potent factor to help us to resist any aggressor. But I am also thinking of a contingency when any one country, however large and however important it may be, will be unable to stand up to an aggressor or a combination of aggressors. That is where the global organization will come in: and from

that point of view India would be prepared to come into such an organization.

HAILEY. Any organization like this may have to use force and, in view of certain ideas held by an important section of Indian opinion about non-violence, do you think that India would be willing to take an effective part in such an organization?

RAMASWAMI. Certainly—protecting others and being protected by others—each for all and all for each.

HOGG. At any rate, would you say that India has accepted what Mr Eden called the lesson of the twentieth century, which is the interdependence of all nations?

RAMASWAMI. I think they grasped the significance of it much earlier, if I may say so, than some other nations.

STEED. When people were talking about International Disarmament and wished to abolish or reduce armaments to a very low level, I've said: 'Do you not think there ought to be an arrangement to forbid or to prevent a nation's armament from falling so low that it would be unable to contribute effectively to an International Police Force?'

RAMASWAMI. You used an expression about 'forbidding countries falling below a certain level'. I say *positively* 'requiring countries to contribute a certain amount of armament or force, whenever the necessity arises, and to keep them intact against an exigency arising at any time'. I think India would be willing to do that.

STEED. Does that answer your question, Lord Hailey?

HAILEY. Not entirely. When Ramaswami tells us that India will be willing to come into an organization like the British Commonwealth of Nations, or even into a global organization, and take the same part in protecting its ideas as, for instance, the Dominions, or when he speaks of her coming into a global organization, does he feel that he is actually speaking for the whole of India?

RAMASWAMI. Without entering into details, I should like to say that the bulk of Indian opinion doesn't believe that either individual or international problems could be solved

purely through non-violence and without the use of force. I'm absolutely convinced that the overwhelming section of my countrymen would agree with that proposition.

STEED. You're convinced that a free India would be very willing to co-operate internationally for the purpose of freeing the world from fear?

RAMASWAMI. I'm absolutely convinced of that.

STEED. Now, there's not only in civilized communities this question of freedom from external fear, but also the question of freedom from internal fear, that is, aggression by this section of the community or that. Then, there's another aspect of possible fear in India, that is antagonism between the big industrialists and the people themselves. But I rather think that internal fear from economic causes comes more within the scope of what we shall discuss at our next meeting—that is to say, freedom from want.

RAMASWAMI. I was going to agree.

HOGG. With this proviso, surely: that it must be recognized that internal disorder doesn't always spring from economic want.

HAILEY. Yes, we must not forget this, that if a nation is to get freedom from internal fear it must secure a very high measure of national unity before it can achieve it. In the case of India we discussed the possibilities of this in our first talk.

STEED. I should suggest this: that freedom from internal fear really belongs to the subject of Freedom from Want. But I don't think we've quite finished with freedom from external fear. An International Police Force would presumably need to act under some international tribunal. And, in my view, it would be essential that such an authority should be above suspicion that it was dominated by the interests of any one section of the world.

Now, I imagine that the suggestions made by Mr Churchill for a Council of Asia and a Council of Europe would eliminate the danger of any sectional dominance.

RAMASWAMI. The idea of having Regional Councils like

that—Councils for Asia, for America, for Europe—is attractive; but I should like to be clear about the implications behind that suggestion. I don't think Mr Churchill or anyone else visualizes that these Councils should function in isolation. They must be interconnected, because if there is any question of using a police force in Asia it's not Asia alone that will be concerned; every country in the world will be concerned. It is an attractive idea to feel that you can have a Council for Asia that will be a judicial body or arbitral body to decide on any infraction of rights by any member in that zone. And to that extent a certain amount of impartiality can be assumed, and similarly for the Council of Europe; but whether the decision of any of those Councils will be accepted by the other regional associations is an issue which still has to be decided upon. How are you going to ensure that the decisions of the purely Asiatic Council will be so respected that every organization will be drawn into any activity which may be demanded as a consequence of that decision?

As I see it, while these Regional Councils may exist and will deal with problems in their respective Regions, there is yet need for a global organization which comprises the representatives of the Regional Councils, and therefore is in a position to exert supreme authority over all.

STEED. There must certainly be a link-up. There can't be watertight bulkheads. The one injunction that seems to me imperative, if we are to have freedom from fear, is to say to everybody: 'Thou shalt not fight.' And it's better to tolerate an injustice for a time than have any fighting over it. Freedom from fear can only be got if people are convinced they will not have to fight. Don't you agree that the essential thing is to tell the people 'Thou shalt not fight'?

RAMASWAMI. But you have to be prepared to fight if you want to enforce the commandment 'Thou shalt not fight'.

STEED. Yes, there must be readiness for police action. But the important thing is to get nations to realize that indivi-

dual national fighting for national purposes is out of date.

HAILEY. That may be: in my view the ultimate sanction lies in the creation of the necessary spirit among those nations that take part in the organization—a spirit of determination to prevent aggression, and if possible to attack all those things which create the inequalities and the disabilities that invite aggression and ultimately lead to open conflict. The guarantee is the spirit of union between peoples; and I think the great question is how far any one people will throw itself wholeheartedly into an undertaking of that kind. I don't mind the machinery—to me far less material; it's the spirit behind a combination of that kind that gives you real chance of success.

STEED. Well now, I think the time has come to wind up this discussion, and I feel that the discussion shows that we in Europe have a good deal to learn from India. Now would you, Ramaswami, sum up our discussion?

RAMASWAMI. India would come into such an organization and would be prepared to throw in her full weight provided the fundamental principles of human dignity, of justice, and of equitable dealing between nation and nation are accepted by all. I believe that there's no such thing as a European civilization and an Asiatic civilization contradistinguished, or a European culture and an Indian culture. Culture and civilization properly defined and understood don't consist in what may be called the outside forms of it which differ widely; they're fundamentally the same to all humanity. True culture knows neither the boundaries of race nor the barriers of religion nor, least of all, the taboos of colour.

And if on this basis this league of like-minded free nations is constituted, India will most certainly come in wholeheartedly and contribute to the solution of such problems as may arise.

III. FREEDOM FROM WANT (1)

Speakers
MR WICKHAM STEED
LORD HAILEY
SIR RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR
MR H. N. BRAILSFORD

STEED. We ought, I think, to recognize that this formulation of the Four Freedoms has come to us from the United States, and that their definition is due to President Roosevelt, and I think we should try to understand why he has put forward these four freedoms as an American ideal and an ideal for the future peace of the world. I believe that American insistence can be traced directly back to the great collapse of 1929.

HAILEY. It seems to me that the depression period which followed that collapse will be found to have had an influence on history almost comparable to the effects of the French Revolution. Much of the modern trend towards concentration on improved social conditions, maintenance of standards of life, and so on, as against the old issues of merely political liberty, is due to the experiences of that period.

STEED. The Report issued by the National Resources Planning Board in 1942 contained these words: 'What the Americans mean by winning the war and winning the peace is the smashing of the forces which stand in the way of these four modern freedoms and the creation of international relations which will do away with the underprivileged of all races and colours in every continent.'

Now, we must recognize that Americans had a high standard of living, and that when they lost this, they probably had in their minds the idea of getting back to it. There are other countries that have not had this high

standard of living, and for them freedom from want will mean something, if not essentially different, at least quantitatively different from what it means to Americans.

You've had a good deal of experience, Hailey, on this question of want in India: how would you put it for India in your experience?

HAILEY. I would agree with you that, while for the United States the depression period meant only the temporary loss of a high standard of living and a fear that it might not be recovered, on the other hand, so far as India is concerned, freedom from want must have a much more stark interpretation than that. For India has been, and is still, one of the countries with a low standard of living conditions.

STEED. Can you tell us anything about the average income per head of the population in India, compared with other countries?

HAILEY. The calculations of economists about *per capita* income are never very reliable, but they do give you a sort of basis by which you can compare the standards in different countries. It was calculated a few years ago that the income per head of the population in the United States was £89, and in the United Kingdom £76. These same calculations give anything from £5 to £8 in India. That is, of course, much lower than the most economically backward of the European countries, though it may be comparable with China.

RAMASWAMI. All observers will agree that the distribution of wealth in India is very unequal, and that while you have certain classes which are undoubtedly exceedingly well-off, yet you have a vast mass of the population which is living just on the standard of subsistence.

HAILEY. Yes, and a small part that is living probably below it, even judging by the standards of comfort necessary for life in a tropical country. As a consequence there is a low state of physical health and vitality in the country, and the problem of India, if she is to get freedom from want, is to improve this state of affairs—to secure first of

all a satisfactory standard of subsistence and of health and then a surplus on that, sufficient for India to develop her own cultural life. The problem is consequently different from that of the United States.

STEED. Now, Ramaswami, how does that strike you as a statement of the position?

RAMASWAMI. I think what Hailey has said is correct as a statement of the general position in India today. There's one observation of his to which I should like to make some modification. In India there isn't that violent difference which exists, for instance, in America, between a stratum of society which is very wealthy and a stratum which is absolutely poor. Taking the population as a whole, I should say that in India there are less violent fluctuations of income between one stratum and another. But I agree that most of the people are living below a satisfactory subsistence level.

HAILEY. I don't know that I'd agree to the statement 'most of the people' but certainly a considerable number.

RAMASWAMI. That there are a considerable number living below the subsistence level is perfectly true, and the problem of the free India (on the basis of which you are conducting this discussion) will certainly be how you can raise it to that subsistence level which the scientists today tell us is absolutely necessary.

STEED. Now, Brailsford, we've had a good deal of talk in this country about the minimum standard of existence and a minimum wage and the Beveridge Report. Have you any general ideas about how India can be given freedom from want?

BRAILSFORD. Your mention of the Beveridge Report reminds us that the whole conception of insurance we've been developing for a generation hasn't yet had even a beginning in India. The idea that the State has to provide for the unemployed or for the sick or for the old has not yet been accepted in India. The difficulty in beginning is, of course, that any Indian administrator finds himself confronted

with a very inadequate revenue. However much he may wish to do so, he dare not appropriate what may be necessary to carry out reforms which are commonplaces with us. So I think you have to turn first to the problem of increasing wealth, and that starts in the village. If I may put it in the simplest possible terms I should say the problem is this. Take four peasants in a village whose labour is now being largely wasted, thanks to the breaking-up of their holdings. . . .

HAILEY. Fragmentation, in fact.

BRAILSFORD. Yes, fragmentation of their holdings, inadequate equipment and old-fashioned methods of tillage. Now, if we could arrange that of those four men, two should produce more food than the four produce today, then we could turn the other two over to building healthier houses and making clothing and tools.

STEED. In other words you are drawing a distinction between the taxable capacity of this country, for instance, which is the background of the Beveridge Report, and the very low taxable capacity of the masses in India.

BRAILSFORD. Yes.

STEED. And you would wish to see this taxable capacity increased?

BRAILSFORD. Yes, through the increase of wealth.

STEED. Well now, that brings us on to a very important question. What is the capital capacity of India, Ramaswami? Has it increased? Is it mainly Indian or European or what is it?

RAMASWAMI. There has been sufficient capital in India all through. It was invested in the past not in industrial enterprise, not in remunerative ventures, but either hoarded or invested in jewellery, which didn't yield any return, of course. The capital is there in India, and at the present time it is more free to come out than it ever has been. As I see the problem Brailsford has put forward, from the Indian angle, it's a little different.

Now, what is your aim here in Britain? It's not pri-

marily to insure people against want, to give old-age pensions or unemployment insurance; your aim first of all is to find employment for everybody. It's where that fails that the State comes to the rescue of the man who is ill or who has not been able to find full employment, and helps him through resources found by the community by taxation.

Now, looking at it from that point of view, full employment is an absolute impossibility at the present time in India. Not only are a proportion of the community employed in no business or remunerative enterprise, but the agriculturist, about whom so much has been said, is actually under-employed.

HAILEY. Yes, some people have said that he is fully employed only for about 200 days in the year.

RAMASWAMI. It isn't that he's unwilling to work, but there isn't the work for him to do, and when Brailsford talks about taking away the two men from the village out of four I feel that it may merely aggravate the problem of unemployment. Some people maintain that this machine age is actually making it more difficult for India to find employment for all her people, and therefore complicating the problem. I personally don't agree with that view: I think the machine age has come to stay and we must find a remedy within the machine age for greater employment and more skilled employment for the people.

STEED. As regards fresh means of employment, hasn't a great deal been done in the past fifty or sixty years in the way of irrigation? To extend the area of cultivated land and to avoid the incidence of famine? Where has the money for this irrigation come from? It's come from the Government, evidently, but has it been entirely from taxation or what has been the origin?

HAILEY. What we have done—and we are dealing now, of course, with one side of an improved economy, the agricultural side—what has been done to improve agricultural production has been effected in several ways. First, there's

the improvement of communications, which of course is essential for bringing produce to market. We have constructed 40,000 miles of railway at a cost of £800 million and 250,000 miles of roads. Then there's the improvement of irrigation to which you just referred. The Government has spent about £110 million on the improvement of irrigation, but that's productive, it pays for itself—in fact it pays a net return of over 5%, and it's actually given India by far the largest irrigational system in the whole world.

STEED. And it has of course increased the cultivable area?

HAILEY. Yes, enormously. Then there's the improvement in the methods of cultivation. You may take it that now a very considerable proportion of India's sugar and wheat and cotton is produced on improved systems—better seed and better methods of cultivation and the like.

STEED. Well, to that extent and apart from the constant increase in population which presses on the standard of living indirectly—apart from that there has been a considerable advance in India towards obtaining some degree of freedom from want in the past?

HAILEY. Yes, the economists, for what their figures are worth, have generally agreed that the increase in production and consumption of food has just kept pace with the increase in population. Now that's a remarkable fact, because of course the increase in population is one of the outstanding problems of India.

STEED. Could you give us an idea of what that increase has been?

HAILEY. Nobody quite knows what the population was before 1872, when we took the first census. Our first census in 1872 gave us 265 millions. Today, as you know, the population is nearly 400 millions, and it has increased most rapidly in the two last decades. It has increased well over 50 millions in the last ten years.

STEED. Is there any ascertainable cause for this modern rapid increase?

HAILEY. I should think it's due partly to health measures. Undoubtedly the famines that visited India in the old days, leaving their legacy of reduced powers of vitality, and the big plague and cholera epidemics which have now been more or less brought under control—the reduction in mortality from these causes has been partly responsible. Now, the fact that disease has been increasingly brought under control is partly responsible, while the improvement in the cultivation of the land has resulted in an increase in the population.

STEED. And presses on the margin of food.

HAILEY. People say that India is not over-populated when they look at the fact that it's only got as a whole about 214 persons per square mile, which is a great deal less than many European countries; but the real fact is that there are many parts of India which are very much over-populated. For instance, take a province such as Bengal, which has over 640 to the square mile and within Bengal some parts work up to 2,400 and even to 3,000 a square mile, and that in purely agricultural areas.

RAMASWAMI. Would you suggest that where there is an increase in population the standard of living is very much lower?

HAILEY. Almost inevitably. The standard of living in some of these areas is almost inevitably less than in areas like the Punjab or parts of Bombay, where the density is much less.

STEED. Now, Ramaswami, we have got, it seems to me, epidemics brought more or less under control, the area of cultivable land extended, and the population increasing immensely. How do you look upon these things as bearing upon the problem of obtaining a reasonable degree of freedom from want for India?

RAMASWAMI. Well, one solution that has been put forward is that the population increase should be controlled, and there are some Indians who feel that the population is increasing at such a rate that it will bring disaster to the country unless some methods of control are rapidly adopted

by the people and the Government carries on propaganda for the purpose. I personally think, apart from the question of whether it's desirable or not, that as a means of raising the low standard of living it isn't a practical proposition at the present time. For two reasons: it isn't a practical proposition because the villager—the man in the rural area where the growth in population is greatest—the less sophisticated villager cannot be made to understand the problems of over-population and much less can he be made to understand how he can exercise methods of population control. He looks upon the birth of a child as a God-given incident and he still retains the feeling that there is a Divinity that is responsible for such things, and you can't drive it out of his head—apart from the question whether it's desirable to do so.

You want to increase the class of population which belongs to the intellectual and intelligentsia classes, but that's exactly the class that's been affected by this modern propaganda to control population, and it's left untouched the vast millions of the rural population with the pressure on the land and the consequent low level of living, which is the problem for which this method is suggested.

STEED. I've seen it argued recently that if we could increase the standard of living for the villagers throughout India, the fact that that entailed a certain higher degree of material well-being would tend to check the tendency to indiscriminate over-population.

RAMASWAMI. I heartily agree with that view, and I was just going to suggest that if you should at any time bring the villager to realize that a smaller family can live more comfortably and better than a large family—it's only by making him realize the advantages of a higher standard of living. The life in a village is so dreary, that the villager says, 'One more mouth to feed doesn't make any difference'. But if you can once get him to realize that there *is* a higher standard of living, that, naturally, will operate much better than all the propaganda in the world.

STEED. But to improve material conditions of living will involve a great deal of capital outlay. Now, where's the capital coming from?

RAMASWAMI. As I see it, the problem of raising the standard of living is a problem of finding employment—full employment if possible, adequate employment at least. Now Brailsford was referring to various kinds of insurance. State insurance in India is a long way off, even after we have obtained freedom, except for the small section of industrial workers.

But in India these things are at present arranged in a different way. Under our system of social life, unemployment and old-age insurance may be said to be undertaken by the joint-family. The system of the joint-family, which is even now largely prevalent in India, makes it possible for the old man who is unable to earn to go and live in the family without contributing anything. There is our insurance system, which, I'll admit, isn't altogether desirable. We shall have to take steps to enable the joint-family to increase its resources so that all its members can be cared for if necessary. Employment of as many as possible is the only way by which you can increase the wealth of the family.

Now, in a very small way in one European country, France, and in one part of that country, the Jura region, they were up against a similar problem of the unemployment of the agricultural population for a great part of the year. They found that with the electrification of the countryside and the hydro-electric works in the mountains they could develop local industries alongside the agricultural work. With the result that for roughly five months of the year the peasants would be employed in various crafts—making pipes, furniture, and so on—and in the agricultural season they would go into the fields. A very high degree of prosperity resulted.

BRAILSFORD. In India there are already developments of hydro-electric undertakings. They are only beginning, but an immense deal has already been done in Bombay.

HAILEY. And the Punjab and United Provinces.

BRAILSFORD. Yes, and also in Madras. After reading some of the proposals put forward it occurred to me that an immense deal might be done by using hydro-electric power in the villages to set up textile manufacture, and in other suitable localities no doubt other things could be adapted to it. I think your Jura model was a most inspiring suggestion.

HAILEY. We have an example of that in India. We electrified something like 10,000 square miles of agricultural country in the United Provinces and already electricity is being used very largely in the villages. But you are coming now onto what I may call the second leg of progress—industrial progress.

STEED. Yes.

HAILEY. Now, India at the moment has attained a position in which she stands about eighth among the countries of the world in the numbers of people employed in industry, and has some 10,000 factories of all sorts, big and little, but these figures would have to be immensely increased if you are to find the amount of employment which Ramaswami referred to. But there's no doubt that it's within the capacity of the Indian population to adapt itself to industrial employment. That's been shown during the war, when there's been a great expansion of industry in fields which we really thought at one time would be much more suited to European than to Indian conditions.

STEED. In one of our earlier discussions, I said that political freedom has cost us in England centuries of struggle and a very long process to evolve it; and Ramaswami said, 'Yes, but it doesn't follow that every country has to go through that same long process: it can learn from the experience and the acquisitions of other countries.' Now the desirable growth of industry in India might involve many of the drawbacks we had in our own industrial revolution, unless the principles that had been worked out here and in the United States and elsewhere were applied there from

the beginning. If we got it solely on private initiative—people putting money into factories and textile works, and so on, in the hope of making large private profits—an industrial system might develop which would not be beneficial to the population as a whole. Do you think, Brailsford, it would be possible in the beginning to apply to India a more reasonable system than we had at the beginning of our own industrial revolution?

BRAILSFORD. Well, my impression is that in the early days of industry in India the workers did go through conditions that were at least as miserable as those of our own early industrial age. The process of regulation by Factory Acts came slowly, and it's only in the last few years that you can say it has been tackled, even on paper. But still, the proportion of the Indian population that has engaged in industry is so small. . . .

HAILEY. Under 16 millions.

BRAILSFORD. Relatively to the whole population it's still so small that it presents no problem comparable to ours. So I think that India could endeavour to raise the standard of life of the industrial population at a very much earlier stage of evolution than was done by State action in this country.

RAMASWAMI. While State industry in India has not been encouraged, State enterprise in many basic things has been more generally followed than in England. It's not generally realized how much State enterprise has been undertaken in India.

HAILEY. What a socialist Government we have been!

RAMASWAMI. What a socialist Government the Government of India, in spite of itself, has been! The entire railway system is State-owned and it's very rapidly becoming State-managed and all the irrigation systems are State-managed and owned and controlled. Much of the electrical development is State-owned. As I see it, these developments, which played a real part in promoting industrial development, will continue to be State-owned.

STEED. Now, this State-ownership was approved, I should imagine, by those Indians who took any part in the Viceroy's Council, and so on.

RAMASWAMI. Not only approved, but insisted upon, and it was on their insistence that the State became more and more owners of these things and an employer of industrial labour in railways, and so on.

STEED. So we can assume that under a Government of a free and independent India this tendency would be increased?

RAMASWAMI. Yes, certainly. But side by side with that there will be scope and encouragement for private enterprise for those things which cannot be undertaken by the State; while State-ownership of public-utility concerns would continue to be the policy of the Government, after that, whatever can be done industrially will be left to private capital enterprise.

STEED. Brailsford, as a stalwart Liberal, how far do you foresee an increase in Indian bureaucracy developing alongside this State enterprise? If this happened would it not tend to curtail the desirable development of individual liberty in India?

BRAILSFORD. First of all, Steed, I'm not a stalwart Liberal, but a decided Socialist, so naturally I feel no horror at the idea of a man passing from private service into the service of the community. I think that people often exaggerate the degree of change which takes place in passing from a large, highly-organized, modern industrial concern—which, in any case, is mainly a monopoly—to State establishment. The chief change is that the technicians gain by a sense that they're working for the common good rather than for the profit of a limited number of owners.

HAILEY. We've been discussing certain economic improvements—agricultural, industrial, and the like—and the part which State and private enterprise respectively could play in these matters, but there is something perhaps even more fundamental than those things. The question is how far

we need actual changes in Indian social habit if India is really to be free from want. I would refer to the social custom which leads to the incurring of debt based on land for non-agricultural purposes, for this has created a vast system of agricultural debt in India. We have already referred to fragmentation and the 25 million surplus cattle. Then again, in different parts of India women's labour is unavailable. There's the caste system which leads to a certain amount of immobility of labour for industrial purposes. There are numerous questions of that kind with which India will have to deal in the future, but doesn't this really come down to the fact that India needs *education* of a type which will help her to find her own way of modifying or readjusting those conditions—social and otherwise—which prejudice economic advance?

STEED. I agree. But this education will require a lot of money. Then, who's to control it? Is it to be a communal education or a national education? Is it to reflect in any way the caste system or is it to be free from the caste system? Can Ramaswami enlighten us on that point?

RAMASWAMI. Well, education, in the widest sense, will have to be undertaken by the future Government. I use the phrase 'the widest sense' advisedly—I don't refer to the elementary school system, I mean that the people of India will have to be educated to the value of being, as Hailey put it, 'economic men'. They must be taught that their comfort can be improved if their standard of living is raised. The process of dealing with the defects to which Hailey referred can be remedied, and will be accelerated no doubt, by education; but India will not wait until that education is completed before the standard of living can be raised or further industrialization can go through. The one is a corollary of the other.

Take some of the problems that Lord Hailey has referred to—social problems. Industry itself has in some measure solved the social problems more readily than anything that has been done by the Government. Take its

effect on the different classes: it is exactly in industrial labour that the barrier of caste has considerably weakened. You find in the textile mills that the low-caste man and the high-caste man work side by side.

Then the distinction between men's and women's labour, to the extent that women in their present state can take part in it, has been cut out in the textile mills. There are various sections where women are largely employed—in the spinning section, for instance. And I think that even the purdah will to a certain extent disappear. Indeed, it will disappear more rapidly if the avenue for employment and earning is there for them.

STEED. Then a progressive victory would be a move in the direction of solving the educational problem and the problem of caste restrictions and several other problems.

RAMASWAMI. They all move in the same direction and solve each other as they go along, and that has been the experience of the last twenty years, which I would like to call the beginning of the Industrial Age in India.

STEED. Well now, Brailsford, I believe you know Mahatma Gandhi himself, and you are certainly familiar with the idea of his spinning-wheel and the insistence he lays on homespun. Don't you regard this attitude, and his prejudice against machinery, as almost reactionary from the social standpoint?

BRAILSFORD. While I have the deepest admiration for Gandhi, I should have no hesitation in calling it flatly reactionary, and I think his attitude is one of the obstacles to Indian progress. My own belief is that any hope for India depends very largely on what Ramaswami called 'education in the widest sense of the word'; by which I should mean not merely education in the school but education so designed as to reach the grown-up peasant in his village. I've seen something of this in the early days in Russia, which had to cope with some problems in the villages which were not unlike some of the Indian problems. There was, for example, among the old-fashioned Russian

peasants, a dread—even a religious dread—of the innovations in agriculture that the Soviets were trying to introduce; and in that kind of difficulty the great expedient that the Soviets found useful was to provide every village with a good wireless set. The peasants were delighted with the entertainment and the dances, but then they also listened to first-rate talks on modern agricultural methods, adapted to their conditions. I'm inclined to think that if this advice came from a Government of their own and from their leaders whom they trusted, Indian peasants would respond just as eagerly as the Russian peasants did.

IV. FREEDOM FROM WANT (2)

Speakers

MR WICKHAM STEED
SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE
SIR ATUL CHATTERJEE

STEED. In our last discussion I happened to mention the Beveridge Report, and Brailsford reminded us that the whole conception of insurance, which we have been developing in this country for a generation, had not yet made even a beginning in India.

Now, Beveridge, we have asked you to join us so that you may enlighten us on this very point. But before we begin I ought to tell you that all our discussions have started from the assumption that after this war India will attain full political freedom and be managing her own affairs.

BEVERIDGE. Well, it's easy for me to make that assumption because my father was saying that sort of thing in India more than 50 years ago. I have just been looking at the evidence that he gave to a Public Services Commission in India in 1887. There he said that he looked forward to the whole administration of India becoming Indian, and he would see the Europeans coming to India mainly for purposes of trade and commerce, and wouldn't allow them a large share in the government of the country. He said all that in 1887.

STEED. Wasn't he a Civil Servant?

BEVERIDGE. He was indeed, and the fact that he talked like that suggests that he was a very independent sort of person. It suggests also, I think, that he had foresight and deep friendship for India. He was interested in the Indian people as independent people, and I think I inherit that.

STEED. Would you, as a friend, advise them to adopt your Report?

BEVERIDGE. No, not as the main measure for dealing with freedom from want. To me the problem of want in India and the problem of want in this country are entirely different. This country, like the United States, is highly industrialized, very rich, and in no danger of over-population. India is still a country with a low productivity per head, with a rapidly rising population. The main problem there is to increase productivity per head. In this country the first problem is to distribute properly what we have. Want here is a needless scandal, which one could avoid by proper distribution of income between rich and poor, between the times when people are earning and the times when they are not earning.

STEED. When you say 'proper distribution of wealth', don't you imply all kinds of official interference and regulations?

BEVERIDGE. Not at all. I imply taxation either in the ordinary form or in the form of insurance contributions: insurance contributions means taking money from people when they're earning and keeping it for them when they're not earning. By ordinary taxation one can take part of the surplus of the people who have more than they absolutely need in order to be certain that nobody has less than he absolutely needs.

STEED. Now, Chatterjee, can you tell us this? Is the number of very wealthy people in India so great that it would make a great difference to the standard of living if you taxed them heavily?

CHATTERJEE. I agree that the very rich ought to be taxed heavily, but as their number is very limited I don't think it would make any great difference to the income or standard of living of the 400 million people in India.

BEVERIDGE. I agree. But isn't there also another great difference between India and this country: that India is predominantly agricultural and, I suppose, will remain so? Or are you going to industrialize it?

CHATTERJEE. I'm afraid I can give only a very rough figure of the proportion of industrial population in India to total

population. I think somewhere about 32 millions are engaged in industry in different forms out of the 400 millions.

BEVERIDGE. That's a small proportion by our standards. For a largely industrialized country a social security scheme covering the risks of unemployment, of sickness and old age, is necessary. But it is quite a different matter when you're thinking of a people the great mass of whom are agriculturists and, I imagine, mainly independent agriculturists and not employees.

CHATTERJEE. That was at one time true. But now we have an increasing number of agricultural labourers who have no land at all, or very insignificant plots of land.

STEED. Are they a floating population?

CHATTERJEE. They are stable in one place—they belong to the village—and probably a good many of them at one time used to own land, but for various reasons they have lost their land, or the greater part of it, and have now to earn their livelihood by working as labourers for the peasants.

STEED. If you have this large population on the verge of falling below the subsistence level, how do you propose to raise the revenue or the productivity of agriculture?

CHATTERJEE. I don't think the existence of these landless labourers affects the productivity of agriculture unfavourably because, after all, they are necessary for agricultural purposes; at the present moment in India they have to be utilized in working these farms.

BEVERIDGE. But couldn't they produce more than they do now per head and so get above want?

CHATTERJEE. I think so. I think these landless labourers are already producing more now than they used to, and if their standard of living could be improved and they had improved implements they would produce and earn more.

BEVERIDGE. You mention implements, but what about machines?

CHATTERJEE. Well, there are difficulties, as you are probably aware, on account of our social customs and of our laws of inheritance. Those things have to be changed gradually,

and I hope they will be changed. But, at present, when a man dies all his sons get a share in his land. Consequently the number of separate plots in a village gradually gets more numerous. As all the sons want equally good plots of land, it gets very much subdivided. It thus happens that the same man owns land in five or six different parts of the village and he cannot introduce many of the mechanical improvements which are really necessary for greater productivity.

STEED. But is there nothing like the agricultural co-operatives in India?

CHATTERJEE. O yes, we have a very flourishing co-operative system in India now—at least I call it flourishing, although it has had its ups and downs. Probably there's a larger number of co-operative societies in India than in any other country—about 150 thousand, I think. But most of these societies at present deal only in credit.

STEED. Supposing your co-operatives used modern machinery, agricultural tractors and so on—you might create a very considerable Indian industry in supplying tractors and ploughs for the agricultural co-operatives' work?

CHATTERJEE. We have already an industry for manufacturing ploughs and implements like that; but tractors are a much more difficult proposition—especially in parts of the country where the fields have to be so arranged that you cannot have very large areas. Rice and jute have to have areas which are partly flooded; and then you have to have boundaries to check the floods; thus you cannot have the large areas which tractors need. But a great deal of improvement has been effected in regard to agricultural implements, and also in regard to seeds and fertilizers and things like that. It's not true to say there has been no progress. But we want still more progress before we reach a stage where there is freedom from want.

STEED. Now, Beveridge, you hadn't India in your mind, of course, when you made your Report. But you know India. How do you view the problem of social security in connexion with India?

BEVERIDGE. Well, for this country I think complete social security is about the first new thing that we want. It isn't the first for India. The main problem of freedom from want in India is, to my mind, concerned with raising the efficiency of agriculture. That, of course, is entirely outside my Report. In so far as India has some industry, however, and is probably going to have some more, then I should say that India has a great opportunity of developing its industry in such a way as to avoid some of the mistakes that we have made—some of the bad by-products of industrialization.

STEED. In our last discussion Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar said that he thought India could avoid the mistakes we made.

BEVERIDGE. She could, but I don't know whether she will because no country likes very much to learn from another. But looking at the prospective growth of the industrial population, there is something which has nothing to do with my Report, but which I should very much like to see India, or indeed any other industrializing country, do. That is to get its industry properly distributed, so as to avoid the dreadful sprawling towns that we have in this country, and in the United States, and in other countries.

STEED. When you say getting industries 'properly distributed', do you mean nearer the sources of raw materials?

BEVERIDGE. O no, not in the least. It doesn't seem to me to matter very much whether the industries are near the raw materials or not, because the raw materials can travel: what I object to is that in this country instead of moving goods we move human beings as strap-hangers in suburban trains miles and miles and miles every day. No, by proper distribution of industries I mean distribution with reference to places where people can live and can live happily. If, for instance, we were making Britain as a new industrial country I wouldn't allow any factory to be put up anywhere without a previous plan as to where the people were going to live who were to work there. That's a new principle that I'd like to see adopted.

CHATTERJEE. I entirely agree with what Beveridge says. In order to avoid all the troubles that highly industrialized countries like England have gone through, we must try and plan beforehand. So far the Indian Government has been able to give its attention mainly to one aspect of the problem, that is to the proper regulation of conditions of industry—such as hours of work.

BEVERIDGE. Also, I suppose, of safety and health in the factories?

CHATTERJEE. Yes. Regulation of industrial labour is a question to which a very great deal of attention has been given during the last twenty-five years. I think we have achieved distinct progress, which has been recognized by the International Labour Organization and other competent bodies. In other respects, we realize that things are going on in rather a haphazard manner in India. If you look at our last Census Report you will find that industrialization has raised many very difficult problems for India. Many of the cities have been growing in a most undesirable manner.

BEVERIDGE. I would generalize and say that if in any country cities are left to grow by themselves they will always in all countries grow in an undesirable manner. What we need in all countries is planned use of land.

STEED. Assuming, Beveridge, that your industries are allocated to suitable districts, would you introduce your principle of insurance from the beginning?

BEVERIDGE. Yes, as part of the development of industry. One must realize that if people are wage-earners they won't be kept out of want merely by having good wages. Because there will be times when they can't earn wages through sickness, accident, old age and—in any changing, dynamic, free society—through change of employment which may mean unemployment, one must have some systematic plan of guaranteeing to wage-earners a subsistence income during those interruptions of earning. Now, the method that I suggest for Britain, the main method, is social insurance, and social insurance means two things: it means

that the income that you give people when their earnings are interrupted is given without a Means Test, without inquiry as to their means. It means also that you take contributions from them while they're earning, in order to pay for part at least of the income they get when they can't earn.

STEED. So you think it's healthier to have a contributory scheme, in order to increase the feeling of dignity or self-respect among the people who are receiving insurance benefits from the Government?

BEVERIDGE. Yes, for this country I have recommended the continuance of the contributory scheme, although there are quite a number of experts who take a different view and say that an insurance contribution is just a tax, and a bad tax, because you make the poor man and the rich man pay the same. In New Zealand it's interesting to notice that they have abolished contributions altogether. They finance social security by a graduated income tax; but I propose in my Report to keep the contributory insurance scheme that we have established in this country, for two reasons. First, I believe that the people of this country want the contributory scheme because it adds to their self-respect. The second, very practical, reason is that if social insurance is financed wholly by general taxation, you lose one very important defence against pressure to pay up the benefits indefinitely, and frankly I want a defence; I want people to feel that for 40 shillings a week in old age they pay so much when they're earning. If they want 60 shillings they must pay 50% more.

CHATTERJEE. I entirely agree that in order to provide insurance schemes India ought to have a contributory system. But the immediate difficulty as far as the workers' contribution is concerned in India is that wages there, until this war-period, were not sufficiently high to ensure a comfortable standard of living. Naturally it would be hard on the wage-earners to have to contribute anything out of their relatively small wages. You know, Beveridge, that industrial labour in India is of a very peculiar type—it is mi-

grant labour. A man may be working in Bombay, but his home may be in Lahore or Lucknow. A worker often goes back to his home and to agriculture, sometimes every year and certainly every few years. And to have any system of insurance in these conditions is very difficult, but by no means impossible.

BEVERIDGE. I agree that if industry has social insurance and agriculture has not, then any movement between industry and agriculture makes—produces—difficulties in social insurance, though I hope not insoluble ones. But movement between one part of India and another ought not to produce any difficulty at all, provided that your security scheme applies to the whole of India. I assume—and I hope—that if you have a scheme in India, you will apply it to all industrial workers there, because to my mind one of the merits of such a scheme of social security as I propose for Britain, is that it emphasizes the unity of the country, and the people; it makes them all members of a great co-operation for abolishing want. It sets up common machinery for meeting a common need.

STEED. Do you think India could afford all this?

BEVERIDGE. Well, I am often asked whether Britain can afford the Beveridge Plan, and my reply is that that is a question with a catch in it, like the schoolboy question 'Have you left off beating your mother?'. It assumes something that is not true; it assumes that wise distribution of your income costs anything. Now, to my mind, it doesn't cost anything to distribute your income so that you spend it upon the more urgent things before you spend any of it on the less urgent things. That is merely wise spending. When people ask, Can Britain afford the Beveridge Scheme? it's like asking if a housewife can afford to buy bread for her family before she buys a radio. Of course she can and should. There's a real question—and the real question to ask is this: If the housewife does spend money on bread first, will she have enough money to buy enough bread? That's a question of the standard of liv-

ing. Now, the answer to that question for England before the war, and I'm sure it's going to be the same after the war, is that we have far more than enough to buy all the bread that is necessary, and have some cake as well. But I am not sure that it is so in India, where the level of productivity is less.

CHATTERJEE. So far as the wage-earners in India are concerned, it would be very difficult at the present stage to persuade them that by contributing to insurance schemes they are doing any good to themselves.

BEVERIDGE. But why? They know they are going to be old, and they know they're going to be sick.

CHATTERJEE. Wages in India are relatively small; it's a great tax on workers at present to give anything out of them—they haven't enough to spare. At present they do not spend any money on doctors or medicines, and they hope to be maintained by their relations when they get old. But they will have to be educated up to these new ideas and they are just beginning to feel that they want these things. I should like to add that provision for sickness and other schemes of insurance will of course add to the efficiency and productivity of our workers and thus help to improve their wages.

BEVERIDGE. Well, you have found a new argument for social security; in a sense the poorer you are the more you need it; by maintaining your health it will help you to increase productivity.

STEED. Then it always comes back to the question of increasing the productivity per head in India. Now, we have to begin somewhere—at what point do you think, Beveridge, it would be best to apply the principle of your Report? Would you begin with unemployment, old age, marriage or health? At what point would you start?

BEVERIDGE. On the whole, I think I would begin by applying social insurance in India where we began it in this country—to sickness, to providing an income for sickness and treatment for sickness. Social insurance for old age is not quite so important because people can go back to

agriculture in their old age, and if they go back they can go on working in agriculture longer.

STEED. Wouldn't this system that Beveridge has suggested mean a very great increase in your medical staff, Chatterjee—in the number of doctors?

CHATTERJEE. I don't think it would because the scheme is at first limited to organized industries—the insured persons would be mostly in centres where doctors are available. Already we have a system by which children above a certain age can't be employed without a medical certificate. Similarly with our Workmen's Compensation, we have to have doctors.

STEED. Have you done anything about sickness insurance?

CHATTERJEE. Sickness insurance is the subject that has engaged most attention in India. The difficulty there has been that there are no statistics available on which to base any proper system of sickness insurance.

BEVERIDGE. Yes, I suppose you have no long-established Friendly Societies, no Manchester Unity of Oddfellows to give you the figures, as they did in the starting in this country of National Health Insurance.

CHATTERJEE. I think the first thing for social progress in India is a comprehensive statistical system.

BEVERIDGE. But you can only get statistics of sickness by having a health insurance scheme, just as you can only get unemployment statistics by having unemployment insurance.

CHATTERJEE. The Government of India made proposals for sickness insurance, but they were turned down by the provincial Governments.

STEED. On the score of expense?

CHATTERJEE. Yes, because whatever, whenever, the Government of India passes any laws which mean expense, it is the provinces which have to bear the cost, and this is a bad system in my opinion, and ought to be changed; whoever calls the tune ought to pay the cost.

BEVERIDGE. I think so too.

STEED. Well, I think it's been very valuable to have had Beveridge here to give us his views and to stimulate dis-

cussions of this kind in India. I think we ought to be grateful to him.

CHATTERJEE. I do think that whatever he says will carry very great weight in India.

BEVERIDGE. Thank you very much. What I have to say isn't mainly related to my Report, and my hope—I'm not going to give any advice—my hope is that India will now proceed to become industrialized while avoiding the harmful by-products of industrialization as we have had them in this country and the United States and elsewhere. There are, I think, four main harmful by-products of industrialization. First, unemployment; second, urban squalor, by which I mean the disorderly growth of great cities, the jumble of living and working places; third, there is malnutrition—hunger isn't a good guide to the feeding of the industrial population as it is to the feeding of an agricultural population; fourth, and last of the bad by-products of industrialization, is total war. That's another story.

STEED. Would you include maldistribution of wealth?

BEVERIDGE. I don't regard that as a major evil comparable to the others. Although I think that on the whole the more evenly one distributes wealth, provided one has enough for any necessary investments, the more happiness you get out of any given quantity of wealth.

STEED. Well, I think the fact that you have written your Report—and thereby acquired a certain notoriety!—will not be regarded as debarring you, at least in India, from showing the interest you have shown in its future and will stimulate a certain feeling of appreciation of your effort.

BEVERIDGE. I would very much like to feel that. As you know, as I have said, I have a hereditary friendship for India, and not only through my father. My mother as a young woman met in England a number of distinguished Indian visitors and at their invitation went out to start a school for Indian women, about 1873. That is how she met my father, so I owe much to India—all my life. Both my parents had this deep interest in India, not as a place to get rich out of, but as a country and a people.

V. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Speakers

MR WICKHAM STEED
MR DESMOND MACCARTHY
MR KINGSLEY MARTIN
SIR SAMUEL RUNGANADHAN

STEED. To me it seems that freedom of expression falls into two or three separate sections. There's freedom of opinion which requires no freedom until it's expressed: then there's the effect that this freedom of expression may have upon the freedom of others to express *their* opinion. Then there's the effect of this freedom of expression upon conduct, and conduct of course is a matter that concerns the whole of the community. It goes without saying that there are different forms of expression—freedom of speech, freedom of the printed word, freedom of public meeting.

Now, MacCarthy, what do you think of the general aspect of this complicated subject?

MACCARTHY. Well, it's quite obvious that people who hold strong opinions want, above all things, to spread them. And to their hand lies a most powerful engine for propagating them—the State. Time and again in the past the State has been called in to interfere *against* certain opinions and certain religions, often with immense effect. Now, as an instinctive lover of liberty I've been trying to ask myself why people with strong opinions shouldn't use this gigantic instrument to crush the errors that they hate.

STEED. You assume that they have control of it?

MACCARTHY. Yes, that they can get control of it and use it to spread the beliefs they approve of themselves. Now, why shouldn't those who are convinced that certain doctrines are false and dangerous while others are beneficent, why, I ask myself, shouldn't they use the power of the State to

root out what they believe to be errors? Well, I believe that the State should *not* be used to stop discussion; that it should *not* interfere with free expression of opinion, for one obvious reason: because it is a power which can be used equally effectively on behalf of obvious error as well as truth itself. Where there's free discussion truth has, at any rate, this advantage: argument favours truth and tells in the long run against error.

STEED. Given, of course, equal ability in the expression of the argument.

MACCARTHY. Yes, given that; in the long run the human mind will prefer a good argument and relevant evidence to a bad one and false evidence.

MARTIN. You remember Milton saying, 'Whoever has known truth beaten in the open field?' I often thought he was very naïve in asking it, but I gather you would agree with him?

MACCARTHY. Yes; it certainly has a much better chance in 'the open field'. If you use force to produce conviction, then I agree that any doctrine backed by force has a better chance of being generally accepted than any other, whether it's true or not.

Yes. People may be terrorized into accepting it or they may be made so uncomfortable that they're forced to take a particular point of view. Of course, there's no infallibility about the conclusions which may be arrived at by free discussion, and conclusions are being continually altered. But I can only justify my belief in tolerance and free discussion on the ground that in the long run it tells in favour of the truth.

STEED. You agree with what Bernard Shaw wrote in the preface to his play *On the Rocks*—that the case for criticism, which I take to mean 'freedom of expression', is that a community can't progress without it, for without freedom of expression you get stagnation.

MACCARTHY. Even if the opinions of the wisest of any particular generation had been stabilized we should have stereo-

typed the grossest errors on even the most obvious points. If we take Bacon's word that the sun goes round the earth, we should be believing it still.

STEED. You look upon the State as an impartial authority—somebody or something that keeps the ring?

MACCARTHY. As an engine for altering opinion so powerful that it ought not to be used on one side or the other in discussion.

MARTIN. MacCarthy is thinking, I suppose, that there are special reasons in this particular period of history why the State may become a danger to freedom. As I see it, the State is tempted to suppress freedom for two reasons: the first is that we are living in a period in which the basic assumptions on which society rests are apt to be attacked: the second is that the State can mould (or suppress) opinion in so many more ways than it could in the past.

MACCARTHY. There have been periods in which people have taken for granted the general form of society—the religious beliefs that were held and so forth. In Britain, as Balfour said: 'People bicker in Parliament because they agree on fundamentals.'

STEED. I look upon the State rather as a trustee—an authorized trustee for the community whose duty it is not so much to prevent the expression of any opinion as to prevent sudden changes in conduct, arising from the expression of that opinion, which would endanger the public peace.

RUNGANADHAN. That is a very important point for India, in view of the great religious and communal differences in the country.

MARTIN. New technical developments have given the State a new kind of power?

MACCARTHY. Certainly the new methods are extremely powerful ones. But in the past the State has often taken one particular attitude and forced it on the community. For example, in Henry VIII's and Elizabeth's time they didn't allow free discussion of religious questions. It might have led to civil war.

MARTIN. Yes. In the religious struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a basic conflict which made people fight all over Europe, and as a result we got toleration; because the two main protagonists went on fighting until they found they couldn't defeat each other so they made peace by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and agreed to divide Europe into spheres of influence. They were compelled to agree with Montaigne that it was putting too high a price on your opinions to roast other people for differing from you.

STEED. Yes, but there was another form of State-control at the end of the eighteenth century, and that was the complete corruption of all prominent writers by the Treasury. Up to 1803 there was scarcely an important writer on the English Press—or at least the London Press—who was not in the pay of the Treasury, and in that way expression of opinion was kept almost completely under control. Walpole also corrupted writers and speakers very freely.

MARTIN. Yes. But these are merely secondary methods: you try them after you've given up roasting people.

MACCARTHY. My view is that the great art of government doesn't lie in avoiding struggles but in conducting them with as little injury as possible to the combatants. After all, these disputants are friends, although they may not feel friendly; they must be persuaded not to attach an exaggerated importance to whatever they're fighting about.

MARTIN. I entirely agree.

MACCARTHY. Moreover toleration mitigates in us all our sense of the importance of our own views.

STEED. Well now, isn't the whole basis of toleration a confession that there is no such thing as absolute political or even religious truth?

MARTIN. Perfectly.

MACCARTHY. Anyhow, I think that is the assumption on which government should proceed.

STEED. You think, MacCarthy, that the ultimate result of freedom of criticism and opinion is that the truth gets a

better chance of prevailing and being spread or spreading itself than it does under any form of State or other control?

MACCARTHY. Yes, but of course the State can't allow conduct which is absolutely inconsistent with its own existence.

MARTIN. In his classical work on this subject, Mill says that the State should allow individuals to demand a change, say, in the property system, but if the demand is made in circumstances which will induce some particular group of people actually to burn down somebody's property then it's the duty of the State to intervene.

STEED. Bernard Shaw says that we are so dangerously uneducated in citizenship that we imagine we have the right to change our conduct the moment we change our minds.

Now, I should like Sir Samuel Runganadhan to tell us how he thinks India will view this question of freedom of expression when she achieves full political freedom—the assumption on which these discussions are based.

RUNGANADHAN. Well, it's only fair to say that, throughout the period of British rule, the Press has enjoyed considerable liberty. Of course the Central Government has power to restrict the Press from publishing articles which, for instance, incite to murder or communal clashes. And we mustn't forget that just the same restrictions apply in every other country. The Indian Press is largely modelled on the British Press. There is the Indian Press Act of 1910 and certain emergency powers which the Government have taken in order to ensure that the Press does not do anything likely to disturb the public peace.

STEED. When India has achieved full political freedom do you think that the Constituted Central Authority will possess the same powers and will exercise them as impartially as they have been exercised hitherto?

RUNGANADHAN. Yes, definitely..

STEED. Let me put this question to you: When India is self-governing, do you consider that freedom of expression will be allowed?

RUNGANADHAN. I think the Press would be just as critical

of a National Government, or whatever power is in authority, as it is at present. To give you an example from present conditions; the Indian-owned Press—and the greater part of the Press in India is now Indian-owned—has often shown a tendency, shall we say, to be pro-nationalist and pro-Congress. But over the last few years many of the former pro-Congress papers have been very critical of Mr Gandhi's policy and of some of the policy of the Congress Governments. So I have no reason to think that, simply because it's an Indian Government, the Press would support it blindly. The Press is showing an independent attitude.

STEED. And exercises its function of criticism in the public interest?

RUNGANADHAN. Yes.

STEED. But it isn't only through the Press that you get expression of opinion in India. There are your big meetings, like the Congress meetings, and local meetings. Then you have processions, very often of members of one faith, that go through towns and villages and this sometimes leads to clashes. It seems to me that you need some form of administrative control to prevent those clashes from taking place or to repress them if they do occur. How far would such restrictions or such measures meet with general approval on the part of the Indian community? Would they regard them as oppressive or as necessary?

RUNGANADHAN. O, they would certainly approve of them on the whole. We have had Unity Conferences in the past, when the responsible leaders of the different communities have come together and have made agreements on the basis of tolerance. Even after those Unity Conferences have met there have been clashes, but these are usually caused by an extremely small and fanatical section of the people. The vast bulk of opinion in India would be against such intolerance. The whole trend is towards the policy of 'live and let live'; towards full tolerance and freedom of expression and worship.

STEED. Well, there you agree with something Ramaswami said in one of our earlier discussions: he said that you may claim that the West, or England, has been the home of political freedom and toleration; India may claim that it has been the home of spiritual toleration, that all through there has been more spiritual freedom in India than anywhere else in the world.

MACCARTHY. I hope the British Government has helped.

RUṆGANADHAN. Yes, the British Government has greatly helped the growth of political freedom. But spiritual freedom is, I think, inherent in Hinduism. The Hindu fundamentally believes that there are various approaches to God and each man must have complete liberty to seek God in his own way.

MACCARTHY. The Hindu attitude, then, is the ideal one for the State?

MARTIN. That, MacCarthy, is a very interesting point. You remember Cromwell said, 'I beseech you in the bowels of Christ to think you may be mistaken'—well now, supposing we assume we are mistaken, can't the State also be mistaken? I don't think we can assume that the State has a purely negative function—I think the State must have a positive function towards the public. For instance, it's impossible to imagine any of the great social services going on without the State telling the public about them; and as it tells them about them it will expect people to take a positive view towards these services. And the line between that and some degree of authoritative statement of its own fundamental philosophy can't be accurately drawn. A State must be to some extent positive and therefore I should fear that a purely Hindu State might be inadequately positive if it really stuck to the basic philosophy you stated.

MACCARTHY. But why do you want the State to be positive?

MARTIN. I don't know that I do. But any student of modern society must realize that it has to be so. Let me give you one example: supposing that you run a radio service—you can't help deciding about something. It is

impossible to have all your talks and all your discussions without ever saying anything positive; and if you do say anything positive you do positively affect people's minds. If your discussions have everything absolutely balanced then the result would be to leave everybody's mind in a state of dither.

MACCARTHY. No, no . . . I don't see that at all! You must remember that the State is a collection of people who have, to continue your argument, the decision in their hands as to what use should be made of the radio for propaganda. It's not an entity; it's a group of people called the Government. To my mind, the important thing is that the State should interfere as little as possible with the beliefs of the people it rules, provided the people don't have ideas which wreck society. That proviso alone should determine whether the State should suppress them or not.

STEED. But surely the function of doctrine is to affect conduct; it is not merely to have ruminations in your own mind. A famous French clerical writer, Louis Veuillot, said to his political opponents, 'We demand freedom from you in the name of your principles and we deny freedom to you in the name of ours.' Now suppose in self-governing India you have a Central Authority, would that Authority have power over the whole of India: or would one part of India be under the control of people not disposed to be tolerant? Wouldn't it be necessary for the Central Authority to see that tolerance really was practised?

MACCARTHY. But tolerance doesn't consist in thrusting down people's throats one particular view. The State is there to 'keep the ring'.

MARTIN. There MacCarthy is stating the ideal Liberal philosophy which has broken down by universal consent.

MACCARTHY. And led to this war.

MARTIN. My submission is, not that there is anything desirable about this change, but that if it has become necessary for the State to organize the externals of social life in the economic field, in practice it becomes impossible for it to

remain completely neutral in regard to social ideas. I wish I thought it could avoid it but I don't think it can avoid it.

STEED. The State is bound to respect the majority opinion when the majority opinion has found expression in a form of government.

MACCARTHY. You see the difficulties of the practical application of such a rule—that the State shouldn't back any particular doctrine—doesn't disprove its soundness.

MARTIN. Supposing the State is challenged by a doctrine which is dangerous to its present power; it's a lot to expect it to be entirely neutral in relation to that doctrine when it has so much opportunity of defending its attitude. When Mill wrote his *Liberty* he wasn't thinking of a State which had wireless at its disposal and spent millions of pounds a year on publications. I agree with MacCarthy that it would be nice if one could avoid positive action by the State, but the fact is, if the State's going to spend millions of pounds on publicity, it's going to say something positive.

STEED. But how to draw the line between true expression and coercion? Voltaire said, 'I detest every opinion you express, but I will fight to the death for your right to express it.' That, to my mind, is the real outlook for anybody who believes in freedom of expression. Yet the work of government has got to be carried on; and this implies a restriction on full freedom of expression. Now, Runganadhan, how far do you think this implicit restriction upon full freedom of expression will be observed in the India of the future?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, it all depends on the amount of organization there is in the country and the amount of public discipline. It's a matter of growth—it will take time—but eventually I think Indian society will evolve along the lines of Western countries.

MARTIN. It's notoriously difficult to persuade people with strong religious convictions to agree that they may be wrong or that it is wiser to assume that they are wrong; but

after a society has settled down there may be agreement to differ.

Would you, Sir Samuel, expect Hindus to have freedom of expression in a Muslim State, and Muslims in a Hindu?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, our Muslim friends say there would be as much freedom for the Hindus in a Muslim State (there is bound to be a Hindu minority) as the Hindus have in Hindustan itself.

MARTIN. Personalities don't figure much in our Press these days. We learned in England to discuss ideas rather than personalities. It isn't the law of libel which has led to this, it's that we've gradually grown out of the custom of mud-slinging, which existed a hundred years ago. Would you expect your Press in India to be very much more free in its attacks on persons?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, unfortunately that has been our experience in the past. Our Press has dealt more with personalities than with principles. When the Congress was in power between 1937 and 1939 it tried to remove all possible restrictions on freedom of expression. Yet the Congress Ministers in certain Provinces complained about the virulence of the attacks upon individuals.

STEED. Well now, what's the remedy? In England we have a law of libel, and this certainly doesn't encourage free expression of opinion. It's an alternative to the French system which consists in an unrestricted abuse of personalities qualified by the necessity of fighting a duel with the man you attacked.

MARTIN. And an occasional assassination!

STEED. Yes, but I've never heard of duelling as a Hindu custom.

RUNGANADHAN. No.

MARTIN. It undoubtedly limits freedom of expression.

STEED. Well, I repeat, what's the remedy? One I can think of is complete scepticism about any attack upon anybody. The other is a remedy by a penal law. Now, there are laws of libel in India and I imagine these would be main-

tained, or modified, by a free Indian Government. But would the Government which applied the law be impartial whether the offence came from Hindu or Muslim?

RUNGANADHAN. O yes.

MARTIN. But do you suggest that would be so if you had an Indian Government?

RUNGANADHAN. Yes. I don't think there has been any complaint so far as our Indian Courts are concerned, and they are largely run by Indians. The law has been applied impartially.

STEED. All freedom of expression is assumed to be freedom of expression within the law: the law being made by representatives of the community. The right to criticize within the law is essential.

So it comes down to this: your real guarantee of freedom of expression in India, as here, will depend upon the integrity and incorruptibility of your Courts and the general law.

MARTIN. I agree.

STEED. That is, until the majority has been convinced and changes the law.

MARTIN. Are you trying to suggest that freedom cannot be an entirely negative affair? I've heard freedom defined as 'the opportunity of continuous initiative'. Freedom isn't merely an absence of certain repressive restrictions. If you consider the State merely as a negative this may mean that the strongest groups or individuals have a great opportunity of taking away the freedom from others. Therefore the State is forced, if it wishes to give the maximum freedom, to take positive action.

MACCARTHY. Ah! That's what I mean when I say that the State must 'keep the ring'. It mustn't allow one strong party to dominate others: it must 'keep the ring'. Although there are immense difficulties in carrying it out it doesn't disprove the soundness of the general principle.

MARTIN. May I push your point one step further? If the State's business is to 'keep the ring' fairly, then would you advocate the suppression of a privately-owned newspaper,

if its owner used it unscrupulously? I am not in favour of suppressing newspapers because the remedy would be worse than the disease. But does it not follow from MacCarthy's argument that he must agree to the State suppressing those who use their exceptional powers unfairly?

STEED. One minute. There are two things included here. The first is freedom of expression through the printed word and the newspaper. That freedom may be curtailed by a newspaper syndicate or a wealthy proprietor. The degree in which this will operate depends on the degree of literacy on the part of the public or the degree to which the ideas expressed can go from mouth to mouth. Then there's the other element, which is more modern—the radio. Now, I imagine that even today more people listen to the radio in India than read newspapers, and the proportion will probably increase in future.

RUNGANADHAN. I'm sorry, but that isn't quite true. The radio is still in a very elementary stage of development in India. It will no doubt in time develop into a powerful instrument of education. But at present we are backward; over 85% of the people are illiterate. As I see it, one of the most urgent and foremost tasks of the new self-governing India will be to push forward both elementary and adult education, using every available means to spread education.

MACCARTHY. With regard, Kingsley Martin, to your argument about forbidding syndicated papers. What I should like to see in a free State is a law that every paper should have a page or two in which people who hold opposite views to that of the paper—opposite views even about the importance of news—should have their say in that paper. So many people only read papers which echo their views. With that plan people would be forced to see that there are two sides to most questions.

MARTIN. I like that idea but it doesn't go far. Press power is exercised indirectly. There's no doubt that the power to influence opinion does fall into the hands of people with a great deal of money. In this way, you're leaving a cer-

tain minority with a great deal of power over the minds of the majority.

And this takes us back to the actions of the State. I think you must have a positive State, because 'keeping the ring' is a very positive action and doesn't consist merely in keeping out of the ring.

STEED. What would India's attitude be to State action? Which side would India take?

RUNGANADHAN. O, I should be in favour of an independent Press.

STEED. But should the State take a positive part or should its action be more negative?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, for some time after India has attained full freedom, I would say that the State will have to have some control over the Press.

MARTIN. What form of control would you advocate?

RUNGANADHAN. You mentioned just now instances where newspapers have come under the control of certain vested interests. Well now, that would have to be guarded against in India where public opinion is still, with the vast masses of the people, in its formative stage.

MARTIN. How would you guard against it?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, some measure of State control would be necessary.

STEED. Let us suppose that a powerful newspaper syndicate puts forward certain opinions which misrepresent the views of the Government in power, and that when the Government refute them in some Legislative Assembly, the Press flatly declines to print what's been said. Would you suggest giving the State power to say, 'Well, you must print the answer: the official opinion must be fairly represented'?

MARTIN. I think that's a very good practical point.

RUNGANADHAN. It is possible for the State to do that, and it has in fact been done. The Government has patronage of papers: it can withhold information from certain papers or give this information to other papers, and in that way show its displeasure or its approval of the policy of the paper, and in that way can exercise control.

STEED. Now, the point we've reached today is that however little a Government or an individual may agree with an opinion which is expressed, the person honestly holding that opinion has a right to express it. There must be the right to answer, and then you get your discussion and you get your criticism, and out of the clash of ideas the truth has a better chance to emerge than it would have if there were none.

MACCARTHY. Another great advantage of freedom of opinion is that it tends to lessen the zeal with which opinions are held. For nothing exaggerates a man's value of his own opinions more than being suppressed. If you allow him to have his say he doesn't hold his opinion with the same fanatical zeal.

MARTIN. Exactly.

STEED. I am coming in conclusion to a question that I think is fundamental. Some nations, some peoples, have a talent for freedom. Am I right in assuming that the peoples of India have a fundamental talent for freedom?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, there's the spirit of freedom—its form and expression may be different but the spirit of freedom is in India, there's no doubt about it.

STEED. What I call a talent for freedom is the willingness, the temperament, the gift, if you like, that says, 'Well, I don't agree with that but I feel that it's necessary for the public good so I'm going to work for it and almost fight for it if necessary.'

MACCARTHY. And wouldn't you agree that the other quality necessary is a willingness to submit to the decision of the majority even when that decision is adverse?

STEED. Coupled with the comprehension on the part of the majority that the minority has to be looked after?

RUNGANADHAN. Well, in India, it's a matter of slow growth. I can't say that it exists at present as it does in Western countries, because tradition and custom have a strong hold on the people and are ingrained in the Indian mind. It will take time and it will only come through the active exercise of freedom.

VI. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP (1)

Speakers

MR WICKHAM STEED
LORD LYTTON
SIR ATUL CHATTERJEE
MR KINGSLEY MARTIN

STEED. Our subject today is 'Freedom of Worship'. It may seem more abstract than the other freedoms, and therefore less important; in reality I think it's fundamental.

If we look at it historically, we can see that the denial of freedom of worship has led to very important political changes. The Pilgrim Fathers left this country in the early seventeenth century and ultimately founded the United States because they were denied freedom of worship. A million or more French Huguenots left France because they were denied freedom of worship. They came to this country and went to Holland, and from Holland to South Africa, and they also spread into Germany and became valuable members of other national communities.

We may say that this intensity of belief no longer exists today; that the economic aspect of freedom, or freedom from want, as well as freedom of expression and freedom from fear—that is to say, freedom from fear of aggression—are more important. But fundamentally I believe we shall find that all these other freedoms are meant to safeguard freedom of the spirit, and freedom of the spirit often expresses itself in freedom of worship.

I don't know whether you agree with that general analysis, Lytton.

LYTTON. Yes, I agree with you as to the importance of the subject, but I think we shall have some difficulty in discussing it unless we can form some idea at the outset of what we mean by worship. We shall find, I think, that social customs and the activities of religious bodies in

political and other spheres are often claimed as part of their religion, whereas really they are not matters of worship at all.

Now, I regard worship to mean first the holding of a religious faith, and secondly, the practice of that faith; and by 'freedom of worship' I mean that a man shall not be penalized because of the faith he holds nor prevented from the free exercise of that faith in a purely religious sense.

STEED. Well, I understand worship as the adoration of some Absolute or Divinity to which an individual is ready to subordinate his personal interests even to the point of personal extinction—even to the point of dying for his faith.

LYTTON. Yes, but this freedom also involves the opposite—freedom to hold no religious belief. A man who does not hold a particular religious belief should not be penalized for that reason, any more than a man should be penalized because he does hold it, always provided that he does not interfere with the religion of others.

STEED. Therefore you come down to the freedom of worship, not to worship itself. Now, Chatterjee?

CHATTERJEE. I am quite prepared to accept your definition of worship, but I say that the idea of worship has varied from century to century, certainly from one age to another. As Lytton has said, worship has got so mixed up with certain other incidentals to worship that it's very difficult to extricate one from another.

MARTIN. Just so, and on that ground I must challenge what Lytton and Wickham Steed have said. I have every sympathy with their effort to put a neat definition round the word 'worship'. The difficulty is to divide freedom of worship from the institutions connected with worship.

Worship means a Church. When you talk of 'freedom of worship' you're dealing with an abstraction, unless you include the freedom of a Church to organize and influence people. If you mean the individual's right to worship God on his own . . .

STEED. One moment, Kingsley Martin. By Church you mean some ecclesiastical organization?

MARTIN. I mean much more than that. I mean a complex organization which incidentally owns private property. Now, if you take any of the great religious struggles of our own day—Mexico, Spain and Soviet Russia are three outstanding examples—in every one of those the State said it was not persecuting a religion at all, but removing the privileged economic position of the Church which had accumulated masses of property over a long period of history. And because of this it was unduly influential in the political life of the country.

STEED. Yes, but against that you had the Franciscan movement which was based on poverty and was ultimately accepted by the Roman Church, though in due course it acquired property.

MARTIN. Agreed. And, in any case, that's an exception. The real point is this: the attack made on the Church by the Republican Government in Spain was not primarily an attack on the Church as such; it was an attack on a particular set of governing institutions which were mixed up with propertied institutions. It was because of this social, economic, political tie-up that so many people in Spain, for instance, regarded it as reactionary and oppressive.

STEED. What we're trying to get at in this stage is the principle.

MARTIN. Yes, but you're abstracting it, Mr Chairman. You cannot deal with freedom of worship apart from the institutions in which it is enshrined.

STEED. Then you cannot say the institutions are based on worship. The principle is whether men shall be free to adore whatever Absolute or Divinity they wish to adore and shall not be penalized in their civil life for the difference of their belief or the way in which it differs from the forms of worship of their fellow members of the community.

LYTTON. Arising out of that I should like to ask how far our discussion extends to the right of religious communities—Churches and other bodies—to the property which they own and the use they make of it, as well as to the

ideas which they instil into the minds of citizens. Does freedom of worship cover the free use of religious property and endowments?

MARTIN. May I give a very concrete example? Wickham Steed mentioned the Huguenots just now. I am particularly interested in them because my own great-grandparents were still spinning silk in Spitalfields in a place granted them by the King of England when they had been driven out of France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

Now, we in England benefited enormously by absorbing this highly industrious Protestant community, and France was correspondingly poorer by their loss. Louis XIV's explanation of what he was doing—I am not prepared at the moment to say how far sincere he was—was that the Huguenots, who had managed to get certain territories for themselves, were a potential source of disruption within his country because their religion was not that of the State. Louis XIV was a totalitarian, and he didn't like a group of people with their own property and legal independence. He didn't like any group of people to have economic power and influence inside his country.

LYTTON. And wasn't that sort of dislike also at the root of the legal disabilities imposed upon Roman Catholics in this country for a long time . . .?

MARTIN. Which were not imposed because of their spiritual faith but because they were part of an international organization exercising political power, which power they had exercised, according to Protestants, against the interests of this country.

STEED. Doesn't that go right back to the Statute of Mortmain which was intended to prevent people leaving their property inalienably and for ever and ever to the Church or ecclesiastical or even charitable institutions? These religious corporations had acquired enormous property.

MARTIN. Yes. And here's a curious instance of religious intolerance. You know recently there was a lot of dis-

cussion in England about whether it was a good thing or not to bomb Rome.

STEED. Yes.

MARTIN. Well, I discussed this question with a lot of people—some of them people who knew the military point of view, others who were experts in political warfare. There was the question, also, whether we should offend a very large religious community by doing so. Then, I even met a man who admitted that the reason he was so anxious to carry out that particular operation was because he hated the Roman Church. No country has a monopoly of fanaticism. This man was a Scottish Calvinist, one whose political judgement was affected by a long-past religious struggle, which in the seventeenth century involved the question of Scottish freedom; it was mixed up with the whole business of union with France and Spain, with the Armada and with Smithfield, with Mary Tudor burning people, and all the rest of it.

STEED. So you think that there are still people who go completely wild in their judgements when such questions are involved?

MARTIN. I do. As late as 1850 the Pope suggested dividing England up purely for administrative purposes into so many dioceses with Catholic bishops, and this made no difference to anyone in England except the Catholics.

Lord John Russell, who was Prime Minister at the time, had tremendous pressure brought upon him. For six months the weekly paper *Punch* had at least one and usually two cartoons about the Catholic Church in every issue. Lord John Russell proposed legislation to prevent this move on the part of the Pope, *Punch* had a famous cartoon of Lord John as a little boy chalking up 'No Popery' and then running away before the police could catch him.

STEED. You are again confusing two things we should keep separate; one is freedom of worship, and one a very important organization that can, as an organization, play a part in the political and economic life of the country.

MARTIN. My dear Steed, the whole point of my remarks, right or wrong, is that I don't believe you can make such a distinction. Because if you tell a Catholic at the present moment, or a Protestant, or anyone you like, that he can believe what he damn well likes but of course he mustn't have any organization to say so . . .

STEED. No. I think you are mixing up cause and effect. The cause—freedom of worship—ought not to be curtailed. The effect—ecclesiastical organization—may need to be kept within the limits of political safety.

LYTTON. If we are discussing the Atlantic Charter and regard freedom of worship as inherent in the Atlantic Charter, what is it people are to be free to do and what is it they must not be free to do, in the name of freedom of worship?

MARTIN. That is the real question.

LYTTON. Well now, I would regard as an abuse of freedom of worship any practice of worship which is carried out to the detriment either of the State as a whole or of any community within the State. I should also regard it as an abuse of freedom of worship if a religious community used its platforms for the propagation of ideas hostile to the established Government of the country or to make attacks on some other section of the community.

CHATTERJEE. I am not sure if I can accept that. I think that if an individual or a community believes that the established Government of the country or, for that matter, another community is doing something detrimental to freedom of worship, they have the full right to agitate and to adopt protective measures.

STEED. You, Lytton, mentioned President Roosevelt's four freedoms. His mental background is that of the United States. In the United States all Churches are independent of the State but they are very powerful. There's the powerful Wesleyan Methodist organization; a powerful Baptist organization; and a very powerful Catholic organization. In fact some of the most prominent religious organizations

in the United States are what we should call in this country Nonconformist or Presbyterians.

MARTIN. Unitarians and Quakers are also powerful in the United States.

STEED. My contention is that you don't get freedom of worship in the abstract by merely proclaiming it. But you *do* get a substantial measure of freedom by having sufficient liberty for various religious bodies, so that they counterbalance each other. In the United States you will find an administration which wishes to have its head re-elected. It will angle for the support of these various organizations. I think President Roosevelt had in mind the kind of freedom which exists in his country—the religious freedom which laid the foundation of the United States—and he wishes to see that extended as far as possible to the whole world. That is how *I* understand his reference to freedom of worship.

MARTIN. I think what President Roosevelt had particularly in mind was to restore those assumptions on which our society is built and which we are in danger of losing since the rise of Hitler. If you take any of the important books on political government and political theory—Mill, Sidgwick, or Bury, for instance—they all assume that mankind has reached one conspicuous hilltop, and has secured for ever the right to freedom of worship and of thought. Bury's book is on the history of freedom of thought, and set out to prove that it is the greatest achievement of man. In that book, which was published before the last war, he says that short of some quite unforeseen catastrophe, freedom of thought, which man has won, can never be taken away from him again. It is one of the lessons that the human animal had finally learnt. I wish he were right in thinking that this is so.

STEED. You mentioned Hitler just now—and he, I suppose, is representative of the Nazi State. Now, behind that Nazi State and its conception lies a wrong philosophical doctrine, of which the most eminent exponent was

Hegel. Hegel deified the Prussian State and regarded it as an object of worship. He called it 'God's movement in the world'. Both in Fascist Italy and in Germany we have had this curious heresy springing up—that the State and incidentally its head are the only real objects for the adoration of the citizen. Mussolini also took his ideas indirectly from Hegel, who wrote what Schopenhauer called 'the greatest German nonsense' but who was the arch-priest of reaction.

MARTIN. May I interrupt again? So much are you right, that Hitler-worship is actually fostered in the German schools so as to take the place of Christ-worship.

STEED. Yes, definitely.

MARTIN. The actual symbolism of Christ on the Cross, of the ultimate sacrifice of bearing the sins of the people—the scapegoat, of course, is common to a great many religions—is used by the Hitler movement to transfer the loyalty of people in Germany from their religion to the State. Young men and young women in Hitler schools talk of Hitler as bearing the sins of the people and speak of him in purely religious terms—terms taken from the Churches and applied to the Nazi State.

CHATTERJEE. I gather it's the view of you, Steed, and you, Kingsley Martin, that the whole idea of Hitlerism and Fascism is to substitute worship of the State for freedom of worship. Well, to what extent is the persecution of the Jews due to a desire to interfere with their religion and to what extent is it based on economic grounds? Personally, I think that it's largely based on economic grounds.

STEED. My own opinion is that the Jews would not have been persecuted, as they have been from the time of the Crusades, if they'd had less money—if their talent for the accumulation of money had been less marked. People wanted to get hold of their money and therefore took a sanctimonious pretext for doing it. I think these two elements are inextricably mixed in the story of the persecution of the Jews.

LYTTON. And of the monasteries at the time of the Reformation.

MARTIN. It's not only the Jews whom Hitler persecuted. He also persecuted the Catholic and the Protestant Churches.

CHATTERJEE. But not to the same extent.

LYTTON. Worship of the State is, I think, a development which must be fought at all costs. It's a danger to all the freedoms involved in these discussions.

MARTIN. Hear! Hear!

LYTTON. We must, I think, be ever vigilant to uphold the rights of the citizen—the individual citizen as against the State—in all cases where the rights of the individual are not in conflict with the interests of the State or that of the community in general. It's necessary that citizens should be very much on their guard against the increasing demands of the State. After all, the State itself is only the creation of the community. Whatever the form of Government may be, there still remain, I hope, the rights of individual citizens which must be respected. The right of worship which we are discussing today is by no means the least important.

CHATTERJEE. Yes, the State, after all, isn't a fixed organization, but is subject to change in its functions and ideology.

STEED. Did he say there 'individuals' or 'religious organizations'?

LYTTON. I was speaking of religious bodies. Freedom to criticize a Government is a political matter which is covered by the freedom of expression, which has already been discussed. I did not mean to claim that the State may not be criticized but that worship must be confined to matters of religion.

MARTIN. Hasn't the confusion arisen because Lytton has very naturally used the word 'State' in two senses. By the State he is really meaning two different things—the State to include the whole civil community of which the Government is merely the instrument, and the State as the organized force of the community. Now Lytton's definition

makes it quite clear that he is in favour of individuals having the right to criticize and to attack those who happen to control at that moment the organized forces of the community.

LYTTON. I do not deny that right to religious communities but it belongs to the sphere of political liberty, not religious liberty.

STEED. We must make a distinction between the State as an executive organization presumed to possess attributes superior to those of the individuals forming the community and the other conception, the democratic conception of the State as the sum-total of the functions which the community delegates to its executive organization.

LYTTON. I think that history indicates very clearly that only Governments which are firmly established can afford to be tolerant. You will never find tolerance in a Government set up by violent action. A revolutionary Government is always of necessity insecure, therefore weak in that sense, and never tolerant. In my opinion toleration is the hallmark of a Government which is firmly established on the good will of the whole body of citizens generally.

MARTIN. Take our own case in England. The last and hopeless Catholic invasion of Britain was in 1745. Yet we went on imposing disabilities on Catholics for three-quarters of a century afterwards. This was because we feared that Catholics might once more attempt to disrupt the established Church and State. As successive Governments became more sure of themselves, they were able to be more tolerant. And here's a point I should very much like to emphasize. I believe that even during a period of upheaval—even during a period in which the State doesn't feel itself too confident—it is good for the individual to fight for liberty. If he doesn't make a stand for liberty, he won't regain it when the emergency passes. It is a duty to stand for individual liberty against the State. Don't forget that the State can be frightened when people assert their rights. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

CHATTERJEE. In India, we've seldom had intolerance or absence of toleration from fear that the State itself will be upset. Muslim missionaries came to India in advance of Muslim invaders and were allowed to preach their faith, even though it is the Muslim creed that salvation can only be attained by belief in Islam or some very kindred faith.

MARTIN. It was a genuine fanaticism?

CHATTERJEE. I would not go so far as to call it fanaticism. But that is their honest belief and it seems that it is often shared by Christians. On the other hand, among the Hindus the feeling has always been that everybody can reach his God or his own future in his own way. Therefore toleration, with a few exceptions, has been the creed of Hindus all through. You get right back to the early period of the Christian era, when we had Christians and Jews settled in Hindu States without any interference with their liberty to worship as they liked. A little later on we had the Parsees, who follow Zoroaster, coming from Persia after that country was overrun by Muslims. They found a similar asylum in a Hindu State.

STEED. Therefore, in the Hindu outlook there is a conviction of the superiority of the Hindu outlook as a whole. But this superiority makes it possible for Hindus to embrace all these minor and less excellent forms of worship?

CHATTERJEE. No, the Hindu does not necessarily consider that his outlook is superior to that of others. Therefore he is ready and willing to tolerate other forms of worship so long as they don't interfere with the Hindus' own form of worship.

MARTIN. In the India of the future, would Hindus feel that the Muslim religion was a threat to their existence or not?

CHATTERJEE. No, I don't think so. When Islam came to India, the Islamic rulers were greatly influenced by the local ideas of religious toleration. Many of them, after a time, were of Hindu descent. With exceptions here and there, the rulers did not practise forcible conversions. Many conversions took place, of course, for political reasons. The

Muslim rulers came to believe in living and letting live. A very large proportion of their officials were Hindus.

MARTIN. Well, if that is true, the future for toleration in India ought to be pretty good.

CHATTERJEE. Yes, so far as worship is concerned. I think the trouble between Hindus and Muslims in India at the present moment is confined to the so-called leaders and largely arises from the struggle for power—in 'power' I include, of course, not merely economic power, but also power of influencing culture in the future, and that I believe is the root of the present trouble.

STEED. Doesn't that raise a question with which we are familiar in this country to some extent—the question that is called Denominational Education?

CHATTERJEE. Well, I'm not very familiar with the details of your struggle, but I think that there may be a similarity. Lytton will probably bear me out that the Muslim fear that Hindus will affect their culture is largely based on their religion. The Hindus have got also a certain amount of fear that in parts of India where the Muslims are in a majority their own culture might be seriously affected.

LYTTON. Yes, I agree with that. From my experience I would say that the Hindu community is a very tolerant community in matters of religion, largely I think due to the fact that the Hindus' attitude towards religion is intensely individualistic.

CHATTERJEE. That is so.

LYTTON. The working out of the Hindu's spiritual salvation is a matter that depends entirely upon his own conduct in life. And since he believes in various incarnations he aims at so conducting himself in this life that he will have a better life next time. His own salvation being entirely individual he's not concerned with the conduct or beliefs of anybody else. You would agree?

CHATTERJEE. Yes, I agree entirely.

LYTTON. I think the attitude of the Muslims, however, is different. They, like the Christians, are worshippers of one

God, and because many Hindus employ images in their worship Muslims often say that their religion is idolatrous. They are definitely afraid of what they would call an idolatrous mentality influencing the minds of the young. Therefore they are very much concerned to keep the children of their faith free from the influence of Hindu culture.

STEED. Well then, in that respect they have a faint resemblance to the Cromwellian Puritans of the seventeenth century who smashed up all the statues and images they could find in the churches because they thought such statues and images tended to take the mind away from the adoration of the Deity.

LYTTON. There is a certain similarity.

STEED. Now, I want to go back and ask Chatterjee whether he agrees with something that Ramaswami said in a former discussion. He believed that the present accentuation of communal differences is due largely to the feeling that the time is coming when the Indians will have to make a constitution for India, and they each want to mark out as large a political territory as they can in their own favour so as to be in a strong position when the new constitution is born.

CHATTERJEE. Most Hindus recognize that Muslim culture requires safeguarding, but are opposed to a partition of the country. They want a political future based on the assumption that a unified National Government will safeguard both Hindu and Muslim cultural and religious interests.

MARTIN. Well, is that so comforting from the point of view of people who ask whether there will be real tolerance in India after the British have gone? If both parties are staking out the position now, are they likely to be tolerant of each other once they've got political freedom?

CHATTERJEE. Yes, they will be. Once some particular constitution has been evolved which both communities have accepted, I am confident they will see that they must not spoil everything by continuous disagreement.

LYTTON. I agree with Chatterjee. I think there's great

religious tolerance in India, and I ascribe it largely to this fact, that in India there are a great many religions.

I used to visit the Christian missionary colleges, and I noticed there many non-Christian Indian students—Hindus and Muslims—who used to attend the Christian services with which each day opened. They listened with great reverence and attention and I inquired afterwards whether there was any attempt to proselytize them and I was assured that there was not. Very few of them in fact became Christians but they did acquire a respect for Christianity as one religion amongst many others; and that was the attitude of all religiously-minded Indians towards other people's religious faith. This impressed me very much, coming from a country, as I did, in which Christianity is the only established religion and people are assumed to be Christians however they behave. I found that in India Christians were judged not by what they professed but by how they behaved. I sometimes heard questions like this:

'Isn't Mr Smith a Christian?'

'Yes, he is.'

'Isn't it a tenet of the Christian faith to love your neighbours?'

'Yes, it is.'

'Then why does Mr Smith hate Mr Jones?'

STEED. I wanted to ask you, Chatterjee, about education in India. But I see that our time's up, so we must postpone the question of education and the part it plays in the freedom of worship until our final discussion.

VII. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP (2)

Speakers

MR WICKHAM STEED
SIR ATUL CHATTERJEE
LORD LYTTON
MR KINGSLEY MARTIN

STEED. At the end of our last discussion I wanted to ask Chatterjee how far education might, or might not, influence freedom of worship. We had, as you will remember, considered freedom of worship both in the abstract and in its connexion with churches, or religious and ecclesiastical organizations. Then we came to the specifically Indian aspects of this 'fourth freedom' and to the ways in which Hindus and Muslims might look upon it. Inevitably this led to the question of education and religious teaching.

Now, Chatterjee, what is the present position as regards education in India?

CHATTERJEE. Well, schools are to a very large extent either State schools or State-aided schools, and, owing to the attitude of strict neutrality of the British Government, there is no definitely religious teaching in such State schools as are open to all communities. Various forms of ethical teaching without religious dogma have been attempted; but I don't know that they have been very successful. The Muslims would like their own religious preceptors to be able to teach religion to their young people. The Hindus would like the same. But the difficulty is that there are different Hindu sects and different sects of Muslims. So what I feel would be necessary for adjustment is that this cultural or religious teaching must be imparted altogether separately from secular teaching. I don't personally see any other solution. Lytton mentioned during our last talk schools and colleges run by Christian missionaries

where Christian religious teaching is given without any attempt at proselytizing.

LYTTON. It's on the subject of education I'm sure that the greatest difficulty will arise and it's almost impossible to distinguish between the subject of worship and the subject of influencing the mind through education. Chatterjee will correct me if I'm wrong, but my belief is that there's no religious education in schools in India such as we understand it here. What the Muslims are afraid of is not of the definitely religious teaching by Hindu teachers, but their influence on the minds of their pupils whatever they teach; their culture, they say, will make itself felt. In their teaching of history or geography, or even such matters as science and mathematics, they fear influence of what they call the idolatrous mind; but I don't think there's any problem of education in India comparable to our denominational problem here, such as Steed suggested, for the sole reason that religious education has not come into the schools at all.

MARTIN. Well, that will probably arise when the British withdraw from India. The problem of intolerance has arisen over education in every country. Last time, Chatterjee, you said that on the purely religious side the communities tend to tolerate each other, but that certain customs will make it difficult. Now, I suggest that the real difficulty will arise over education: both sides will fear that education will be used as the lever for strengthening the power of the other side.

CHATTERJEE. I quite agree; but I should think that just as it happened in European countries there would be gradually an adjustment in India in this matter. I think Lord Lytton went a little too far when he said that the Muslims object to Hindus teaching their boys any subject, whether it is history or geography, science or mathematics. I do not personally believe that Muslims feel that their boys could be led astray when being taught science or geography by a Hindu.

MARTIN. British Catholics take that view in England!

LYTTON. I'd like to give you, if I may, an actual experience on which my statement was based.

When I was in Bengal I was instrumental in doing away with English as the language of instruction and examination in the Bengal schools, and allowing Bengali to take its place. I was personally strongly in favour of this because I believed that much of the confusion in the minds of Indians arose from the fact that they were taught everything in a language with which they were not familiar by teachers who themselves were not familiar with the language in which they taught; and I was anxious that they should be taught every subject in their own language, always on the condition that English was efficiently taught by good teachers as a subject of the curriculum.

MARTIN. I suppose you met with considerable opposition? Religions have always a vested interest in education.

LYTTON. Well, there was some opposition from the British—that was to be expected—but I also encountered very strong opposition from Muslims which I did not expect, and the reason they gave me was this: they said that the Bengali language spoken in the Muslim families in Eastern Bengal (where Muslims largely predominate) differed so much from the Bengali of the textbooks that even Bengali-speaking children of Muslim parents in Eastern Bengal would have to learn Bengali now, and learn it from Hindu teachers. In consequence of that they would be imbued with Hindu culture and this they objected to.

Now, to me this was not a convincing argument, because I felt that the language spoken by the Muslims of Eastern Bengal differed no more from the language of the textbooks than, for instance, the English spoken in a Scottish family from the English taught and spoken in an English school. And it was, I thought, a great exaggeration to say that they would have to learn their language anew.

I only mention this because this argument was actually

used to me by my Muslim advisers as a reason for objecting to that particular measure.

CHATTERJEE. I can understand to some extent the motive which led Lytton's Muslim advisers to put forward this objection. My own belief is that there was quite another reason for this objection. The written language in Bengali differs vastly (or at least it did thirty or forty years ago) from the spoken language; and naturally many Muslims in Eastern Bengal didn't always understand the written language. That was also, in most instances, true of the Hindus: the ordinary people of both communities, specially uneducated persons, didn't understand the written language, which was very stilted and Sanskritized; the tendency recently has been to approximate the written to the spoken language so that it can be understood by the people.

STEED. To bring, for instance, the leading article in *The Times* nearer to Basic English!

CHATTERJEE. Not quite, perhaps. In the written language are now used many words which, though in colloquial use, were in former times avoided by writers. The language of the best writers now is racy and idiomatic but not united in vocabulary. This difficulty about languages has also arisen in other parts of India. But the reform which Lord Lytton tried to effect—about teaching in the schools right up to the matriculation stage of the university in the language of the province—has now been accepted in most parts of India in spite of the Hindu-Muslim controversy. I don't think there has been any Hindu-Muslim controversy over the replacement of the English language by the Indian languages of the provinces for the purpose of teaching.

STEED. Now, I want to get back to a matter which seems to me fundamental as regards the future. We were talking of the religious aspect of education. Hitherto the schools, Chatterjee has said, have been either State schools or State-aided. I imagine that the Central Authority in an India which has attained full political freedom would also con-

tinue the practice of State-aided or State schools. In order to preserve peace, I imagine that instruction in Islam would be given by Muslims; and instruction for Hindus given by Hindus.

Well, who would pay for this separate denominational instruction? Would it be the communities or would it be a matter for the State?

CHATTERJEE. I think that would be a matter of adjustment. But I expect that in many cases the communities would pay for it themselves: and I personally wouldn't object to the State making grants for the purpose to each community. In the case of the Hindu, the difficulty would be to give any particular kind of religious teaching which would not be objected to by members of other sects in the same community.

MARTIN. We have very much the same difficulty here. In the controversy about religious education in this country one great problem has always been that the Catholics insist that all teaching—I believe that they make one exception for mathematics—all teaching must be given by Catholics. They go beyond the old Jesuit maxim that those who have control of a child for the first seven years of his life will really dominate all his future. Other denominations are prepared to say that, so long as they're allowed to give a certain amount of doctrinal teaching in their own faith, they are satisfied and are prepared to allow secular education on all ordinary subjects.

LYTTON. Yes, but there's a very great difference in India, because in India—Chatterjee will correct me if I'm wrong—there are definite Islamic schools and colleges and there are Hindu schools and colleges, but both of them are supported by State funds. Am I right?

CHATTERJEE. Yes, that is true, in certain cases. Some of these are State or State-aided, others are maintained by private funds. But the vast majority of schools and colleges are open to all communities.

LYTTON. And there's no question of teaching Muslim boys in a Hindu school or Hindu boys in a Muslim school—they're quite distinct.

CHATTERJEE. There I don't think you are quite right. There are plenty of Hindu schools where Muslim boys are taught, and similarly there are Muslim schools where Hindu boys are taught. Even the Aligarh University, which is a Muslim university, opens its doors freely to Hindu students, many of whom distinguish themselves there. Some of the teachers are, or were until recently, Hindus. And I believe—I am not quite sure—that the Hindu University at Benares is open to Muslim students.

LYTTON. Yes, I know; but what I meant was that there was no question of Muslim religion being taught to Muslim boys in Hindu schools or Hindu religion to Hindu boys in Muslim schools—religion as such is not taught in the schools at all.

STEED. Well now, that brings us to a point which I think is particularly interesting. If I've understood you rightly, you believe that both Hindus and Muslims in India appreciate the value of the principle underlying freedom of worship sufficiently to permit a tolerant system of education to continue or even to be extended. They would recognize that this freedom would tend to promote the zeal of the community as a whole?

CHATTERJEE. Yes.

STEED. And they would not seek to restrain it or limit it in the interests of their particular faith?

CHATTERJEE. I don't think there's very much religious intolerance in the villages even now. . .

MARTIN. Is there communal intolerance?

CHATTERJEE. Well, Hindus and Muslims in the villages live happily and quietly side by side; but where politics are influencing people you at once get a certain amount of intolerance, or rather jealousies regarding political power.

MARTIN. In the future, will the village tolerance influence the city or the city intolerance influence the village?

CHATTERJEE. I myself hope that with more education of the right type, toleration will develop everywhere and people will again see that you can live in close, friendly neighbourliness with people of a different faith and different observances.

STEED. It's your view that, as regards freedom of worship, India is probably more mature than a good many European countries?

CHATTERJEE. That is certainly my own belief.

MARTIN. After all, she's had more time to become mature.

STEED. And therefore the application of the other three Freedoms to India will not be limited or invalidated by any kind of fanaticism?

CHATTERJEE. I don't see why any of the Four Freedoms should be either limited or invalidated.

LYTTON. I would like to mention one subject—I don't know whether you would consider it relevant or not. It's the question of where religion and politics become indistinguishable.

It was Lord Willingdon's policy in Madras to establish Governments on a definitely religious-community basis between Brahmin and non-Brahmin; and in the first reformed Assemblies, the parties in Madras were Brahmin and non-Brahmin.

MARTIN. The point, I suppose, being that caste is a matter of birth?

LYTTON. Yes. That was the point I took up with Lord Willingdon. I objected rather strongly to his encouragement of the division of parties which depended upon the accident of birth and could never be altered. A man is born a Brahmin or a non-Brahmin and nothing can change his caste. Lord Willingdon's answer to me was: 'That's quite true, but I am trying to establish a habit of political co-operation, and this is a division which actually exists today and which people therefore understand: you will find in time when they have got the habit of working together in organizations of Brahmins and non-Brahmins that they

will split up amongst themselves into political differences.' For the same reason I gave Lord Willingdon I have often objected to communal franchise because in my view it makes for intolerance, since a man who is elected in a Muslim constituency is judged by whether or not he's a good Muslim. If he's elected in a mixed community on mixed franchise he's judged by whether he is equally considerate of the interests of Hindus and Muslims, and that tends in the course of time to create political toleration.

STEED. In other words, instead of being a mandatory he becomes a trustee?

LYTTON. Yes; and although I have said that there is in India great religious toleration there is also great political intolerance.

STEED. Is that because politics involve a struggle for power?

LYTTON. Yes: and the best way of getting rid of that, I thought, was that a man should represent his constituents, whether they were Hindus or Muslims, and study their political interests regardless of their religious faith. But so tenacious are the Muslims in their insistence on the communal electorates that I entirely failed to convert them to my view or to minimize in any way their insistence on the preservation of that system.

MARTIN. I am extremely interested to hear you tell that story. I have always believed that Morley's introduction of the communal franchise caused a great deal of trouble. It was a disastrous mistake, in my view.

CHATTERJEE. If I may say so, I entirely agree with Lord Lytton's analysis of the effects of a system of communal electorates. I may add that what Lord Willingdon said to Lord Lytton on the subject of the Brahmin and non-Brahmin parties in Madras disappearing in the course of time has actually come to pass; in recent years, certainly in the last ten or twelve years, there has been no political division in Madras based on Brahmins and non-Brahmins.

STEED. But are there Congressmen now among non-Brahmins and non-Congressmen amongst Brahmins?

CHATTERJEE. Yes, there are. My great hope is that once India gets freedom Indians will find that economic questions will claim and almost absorb the attention of all our political bodies. I hope that each community will be allowed to settle for itself its religious interests and also such cultural interests as are intimately bound up with religion. But economic problems affect Hindus, Muslims and Christians equally. I have a firm hope that when this fact is fully realized and when Indians realize the necessity of improving the economic condition of the masses of our population, all communities will combine in a common endeavour and such things as a communal franchise will disappear.

LYTTON. Well, we must all hope that.

STEED. So the great objection—that while Hinduism is tolerant of other religions, it insists on social and religious distinctions (as instanced by caste and untouchability)—will disappear, or at any rate be overridden by the urgent necessity of political and social co-operation?

CHATTERJEE. I personally am very hopeful about it—more than hopeful, I am confident on that score. I do not believe that caste in India in its present rigid form can exist much longer. Many caste restrictions have already been largely relaxed. So far as untouchability is concerned, my own belief is that, since the so-called untouchables now realize that they have rights of their own, nobody can now stop them from securing those rights and asserting their position in the political and social life of India.

STEED. Well then, it comes down to this. India, after the attainment of freedom and working out the constitution in agreement between the main religious communities, will not only be in no danger of strife over worship but may even serve as an example to other nations where this kind of strife has gone on.

CHATTERJEE. Yes, I certainly hope so, and I am personally very confident.

MARTIN. We get back to a distinction we've made all through. There's the view that the individual has rights

by virtue of the fact that he is an individual—he only gives up some of his rights to the State for the sake of convenience. According to our view the individual is the ultimate reality and the State his servant. In sharp contrast, totalitarians make the State the reality. Now, in your opinion, Chatterjee, there's no danger of India becoming totalitarian in the sense of deifying the State and subordinating the individual?

CHATTERJEE. I think there's really no danger, although within the last few years there have been indications of certain parties becoming totalitarian; I think that's only a temporary phase.

LYTTON. Yes, I agree it would be resisted.

CHATTERJEE. The present totalitarian attitude has been used by the parties as machinery for obtaining political power. I don't think Indians as a whole or any of the parties in India, religious or economic, would agree ultimately to any kind of totalitarianism.

MARTIN. In other words, it's only a reflection of the violence of the political struggle?

CHATTERJEE. Yes, I think so.

LYTTON. Up till now the tendency has been not so much to worship the State, or worship the Government, as to mistrust and oppose it. The reason for this is obvious, but so ingrained in the mind of the Indian politician has the notion become that it is his business to oppose the Government that even when a Government is created from his own followers and supporters he is apt to regard it as his duty immediately to oppose it. For some time to come the difficulty will be rather for Governments to get sufficient support than for Governments to be so supreme as to be tyrannical.

STEED. I remember Clemenceau once complaining to me during the last great war that he got no real support in the French Chamber: 'Now your Mr Lloyd George', he said, 'has the whole country behind him, and your Parliament backs him up. Here am I in power, and the whole country

criticizes me and everybody seems to distrust me. I wish to goodness our people were more like the British.'

'Well,' I said, 'my dear Clemenceau, you're well enough acquainted with England to know that our conception of government is that the Government represents *us*. In France, when a statesman comes into power, he represents the State, and the State hasn't changed fundamentally since Louis XIV. Your Parliament is regarded as a brake on an absolute authority. Therefore, your Parliament has an element of distrust of the State. You, being a member of Parliament, voiced that distrust by constantly attacking the Government and overthrowing it. Now, you've become the Government, the members of your Parliament distrust you because you represent the State. Your parliamentary system is organized on distrust of a Government formed of men who distrusted the State: and distrust of distrust isn't the same as trust. Now, so far as India is concerned, don't you, Chatterjee, think that the overthrow of the totalitarian principle in Italy and Germany as a result of this war will be a very potent corrective of any totalitarian tendency in India?

CHATTERJEE. I can assure you that Indians of all classes and of all communities have from the first condemned the totalitarian principles adopted in Germany and Italy. There has been very little sympathy, if any, with either Hitler or Mussolini in India on the part of anyone.

With regard to what Lord Lytton said just now about Indians thinking it their duty to oppose any Government, may I remind him that when the Congress Ministries came into power in certain provinces five or six years ago, practically all their followers supported them. In Bengal there's been a certain amount of difficulty because the parties there are so well balanced. But in the Punjab, the Ministry has been strong enough to get support from the bulk of its adherents.

STEED. You think that Indians will back up their own form of government, where they would feel a certain distrust of the British Government?

LYTTON. May I interrupt to say that I was not apprehending the danger that an Indian Government would not get any support from Indians. I was merely trying to emphasize what Chatterjee had said—that the tendency in India has been the opposite of State-worship—and I think that in India, from long habit, the Legislatures will try to usurp executive functions.

STEED. Now, I think the time has come to sum up these discussions. We have discussed Freedom from Want pretty amply. We have discussed Freedom from Fear, and the part that India would play in an international community if that international community be attainable. We have discussed Freedom of Expression and we have touched upon Freedom of Worship.

I think that as regards India the outcome of these discussions has been eminently satisfactory. It has given, to me at any rate, a much more hopeful view of the possible future in India than one entertained before.

If India can show the world that despite all religious differences Indians can work together for the good of their own country, she may set a very valuable example to other countries where divisions are perhaps less apparent but no less profound.

And I think that the ideas that have been brought out, and the confident faith that has been expressed by you, Chatterjee, by Ramaswami, and by the High Commissioner, give us reason to hope that the future will be brighter for India, indeed for the whole world.

INDIA
AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

THE B.B.C. received a number of letters from listeners in India containing questions on points raised by the discussions published in this pamphlet. Because the Four Freedoms were first enunciated in the Atlantic Charter, the following question and the answer given to it by Mr Wickham Steed are of fundamental importance.

QUESTION. Should India and other Asiatic Nations be kept out of the Atlantic Charter?

STEED. The answer is emphatically 'No'! The question seems to suggest that somebody or other wants to exclude India and the rest of Asia from the Atlantic Charter. It is surprising that such a question should be put at all after what has been said by responsible statesmen. But to make assurance double sure I have asked the Secretary of State for India, Mr Amery himself, about it. He authorizes me to say that the Atlantic Charter obviously applies to India, and that its principles were laid down and announced with reference to India even before the Charter was issued by President Roosevelt and Mr Winston Churchill.

Article Three of the Atlantic Charter declares that we respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live. But a year earlier we declared that India shall have the right to frame her own constitution for a free India at the earliest possible moment after the war.

Then Sir Stafford Cripps went out to make it clear beyond question that we wish India after the war to be as free as ourselves, to enjoy all the privileges of partnership in the British Commonwealth of Free Nations, or to abandon those privileges if she should wish to do so. If that isn't in accordance with the Atlantic Charter I don't know what is.

As to the rest of Asia, we have to remember what President Roosevelt said at a press conference on 27 October 1942, when a questioner pointed out that Mr Wendell Willkie had found that in some countries the Charter was thought to have only a limited significance. The President answered that twice at least since the Charter was signed he had made it clear that it applies to all humanity.

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

THESE pamphlets have been welcomed by all sections of the Indian Press, and a few extracts from newspaper and radio notices are appended:

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The Sunday Standard: 'In every way—in scholarship, style, treatment and production—these pamphlets rank on a par with the regular Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs. They are extremely handy and nothing more authoritative could be wished for.'

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See the back cover for a complete list of the titles published.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
INDIAN BRANCH

SOME NOTES ON THE SPEAKERS (CONT.)

DESMOND MACCARTHY, author, literary and dramatic critic, was at one time editor of *Life and Letters*. He is a well-known broadcaster on literary subjects.

KINGSLEY MARTIN, one-time lecturer on Political Science at the London School of Economics, turned to journalism and has been editor of the *New Statesman and Nation* since 1931.

SIR SAMUEL RUNGANADHAN, a former Vice-Chancellor of Madras University, was one of the Advisers to the Secretary of State for India from 1940 to 1943. He is now India's High Commissioner in London.

LORD LYTTON, born in Simla in 1876, the son of the then Viceroy, himself acted as Viceroy in 1925. He was Under-Secretary of State for India from 1920 to 1922 and Governor of Bengal from 1922 to 1927. He led the Indian delegation to the League of Nations Assemblies in 1927 and 1928.